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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Effectiveness of the Raskin Program 
 
The Raskin program is a subsidized rice program for poor families which provides 10 kg of 
rice per poor households at the price of Rp1,000 per kg. This report describes the findings of 
the study undertaken by the SMERU Research Institute to uncover the effectiveness of the 
Raskin program in achieving its objectives as well as to obtain lessons learned to improve the 
program. This qualitative study uses three different approaches to data collection: document 
review and secondary data analysis or meta- evaluation; interviews of key informants at the 
central level; and field study. The findings suggests that, in general, the Raskin program 
indicates relatively low effectiveness, that many problems emerge in the distribution of the 
rice from the primary distribution point to the beneficiaries, and that the issues faced are 
actually similar each year. The low effectiveness of the program is indicated by the lack of 
program socialization and transparency; inaccurate targeting, amount, and frequency of rice 
received by beneficiaries, as well as price of rice; high cost of program management, 
ineffective monitoring and evaluation; and ineffective complaint mechanism. 
 
Keywords: Raskin, program evaluation, poverty reduction program 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The Raskin program is a national program aimed at helping poor households to fulfill their food 
needs and reducing their financial burden by providing subsidized rice. The program is a 
continuation of the Special Market Operation (OPK) program launched in July 1998. In 2007, 
Raskin plans to provide 1.9 tonnes of rice for 15.8 million poor households with the total cost of 
Rp6.28 trillion. Each targeted household should receive 10 kg of rice each month with the price 
of Rp1,000 per kilogram at the distribution point. The State Logistics Agency (Bulog) is 
responsible for the distribution of rice to the distribution points, while the local government is 
responsible for distributing the rice to poor households from the distribution points.   
 
The Raskin program has been modified several times, but the program’s effectiveness is still 
debatable. In light of this, the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) asked The 
SMERU Research Institute to study the effectiveness of the Raskin program and to draw 
lessons that can be used to improve the program. The study used the meta-evaluation method 
(document review and secondary data analysis) supported by: interviews with key informants 
at the central level and field research. The following describes the main findings of the study.  
 
In terms of rice distribution up to distribution points, Bulog has conducted its task relatively 
well as mandated by the program guidance. Nevertheless, the program’s success cannot be 
assessed solely based on this fact because Raskin is a program to distribute subsidized rice to 
poor households and not just to distribution points. The problems with Raskin’s implementation 
often occurred from distribution points up to household beneficiaries. 
 
According to the Raskin General Guidelines, Raskin’s success can be measured based on the 
level of achieving the “6T” (six correct) indicators: correct target, correct amount, correct 
price, correct time, correct quality, and correct administration. In general, the results of the 
study on Raskin program’s implementation show that the program’s effectiveness is still 
relatively low. This is shown in the program’s lack of socialization and transparency; 
inaccurate targeting, prices, amounts, and distribution frequencies; high management cost; 
below optimal monitoring; and poorly functioning complaints system. The main findings of 
the research are presented below. 
 
 
A. Socialization and Information Transparency 
 
Program socialization is one of the keys to a successful program, but Raskin’s General 
Guidelines do not regulate socialization activities in detail. This has led to the varied 
socialization activities aimed at local officials in the regions and the program’s weak 
socialization to the community.  
 
1. The document review concludes that the Raskin program was socialized to implementers at 
various levels of government using a structural-bureaucratic approach. There were no 
specific meetings to socialize the program; rather it was discussed in general meetings. This is 
in line with field findings that the socialization was conducted in stages based on the level of 
government and usually at the same time with monitoring and evaluation activities. 
Socialization at the provincial level was conducted twice a year. At the district/city level, 
socialization activities varied depending on each regional government. 
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2. It can be concluded from the document review and field visits that one of the program’s 
weak points is the informal method of socializing the Raskin program to the community 
via village/kelurahan officials and local people distributing the rice to the beneficiaries. 
Generally, the community and Raskin beneficiaries have not received comprehensive 
program information; in fact, many were not aware of general information about the 
program, such as what the program name means, how much rice beneficiaries are 
entitled to receive, what the government-stipulated price of the rice is, and how often or 
how many times a year they should receive the rice. Nevertheless, the community was 
widely aware of the essence of the program—that Raskin is rice assistance from the 
government for poor communities.  
 
3. Limited socialization influences the program’s transparency to the community and has 
the potential to cause corruption, inaccurate targeting, and the inaccurate perception held 
by regional governments that Raskin is a central government program which negatively 
influenced their commitment to supporting the program’s implementation.  
 
4. The results of both the document review and field visits show that the program is still 
relatively opaque. This can be concluded by the poor availability of general information 
on the program, lists of beneficiaries, and pricing. SMERU did not come across any 
information about the Raskin program posted in public places in any of the sample 
regions, with the exception of Kabupaten Agam, West Sumatra, where the community 
had access to information on beneficiaries.  
 
 
B. Beneficiaries, Targeting, and the Amount and Price of Rice 
 
In general, there are still problems with the distribution of Raskin, such as under-coverage 
(the maximum number of poor household (RTM) beneficiaries is below the total number of 
RTM), inaccurate targeting, shortfalls in both the amount of rice that the majority of 
beneficiaries received and how often they received it, and inconsistencies in the price that 
beneficiaries paid. 
 
1. Until 2005, the Raskin program targeted households falling into the preprosperous (KPS) 
and prosperous I (KS-1) economic classifications based on data from the National 
Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN). Since 2006, the program has targeted 
households categorized as poor households (RTM) according to the results of the BPS 
PSE-05 (2005 Household Socioeconomic Survey) data. As RTM are spread across all 
administrative levels of all regions, the Raskin program operates in all regions, without 
differentiating between regional poverty conditions. Nevertheless, the document review 
reveals several cases where subdistricts (kecamatan) or villages/kelurahan did not receive 
Raskin for a certain period due to outstanding payments, implementational deviation, or 
a request from the subdistrict. 
 
2. The Raskin program’s targeted number of RTM is increasing by year, but is still lower 
than the total number of RTM. For instance, the program targeted 19.1 million RTM in 
2007, but the central government only agreed to 15.8 million RTM. Consequently, 3.3 
million RTM did not receive a Raskin rice quota. Based on the document review and 
field visits, the allocation shortfall led to the emergence of various implementational 
problems, such as targeting issues, inaccurate amounts, and inconsistent distribution 
frequency. The insufficient national allocation as well as the inaccuracy of BPS’s RTM 
data—that is, some poor households were not listed while nonpoor households were 
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listed as RTM—were often used by regional governments to justify their divergence from 
the stipulated distribution mechanisms and target beneficiaries. 
 
3. Raskin’s 2001–2005 General Guidelines stated that household beneficiaries should be 
determined during community consultative meetings at the village level (mudes) by 
referring to BKKBN’s KPS and KS-1 data. However, Raskin’s 2006–2007 General 
Guidelines do not stipulate that mudes must now refer to BPS RTM data. Furthermore, in 
the chapter on determining beneficiaries, there is no statement that beneficiaries must be 
poor households. Implementers can use these oversights to justify the distribution of 
Raskin rice to nonpoor households or the even distribution of Raskin rice to all 
households, as long as the decision is made during a mudes. 
 
4. The document review also reveals that mudes are not implemented in all villages/kelurahan 
and that even if a mudes does take place, the process is not ideal, does not involve most of 
the community members, and is generally not aimed at improving targeting. This is 
supported by field findings that mudes are only held in the sample villages in East Java 
and only with the aim to obtain agreement to distribute the rice evenly to all households 
regardless of their economic status.   
 
5. The document review shows that targeting is Raskin’s weakest point, as some poor 
households are not listed as beneficiaries while nonpoor households are listed. Results of 
the analysis of Susenas data support this finding. 
 
a. Raskin is received by households from all prosperity groups (all quintiles of 
households based on household expenditure per capita). Households in quintile 1 
and 2, the least prosperous, only account for 53% of all beneficiaries; in other words 
there is 47% leakage. The three sample provinces in the study all demonstrate similar 
figures.  
 
b. During 2005–2006, the proportion of poor households reached by the Raskin 
program increased by 19.8 percentage points, from 62.9% to 82.7%. Unfortunately, 
the increased coverage of poor households was accompanied by an increase in the 
coverage of nonpoor households by as much as 8 percentage points, or an increase 
from 23.8% to 31.8%. 
 
c. The correlation between Raskin beneficiaries and RTM status between 2005 and 
2006 increased from 40% to 48%. Nevertheless, the figure is still relatively low. 
 
6. Field findings show varied targeting accuracy. Targeting in West Sumatra is relatively 
accurate. In this region, BPS data is used, but minor adjustments are made as the data is 
considered to be slightly inaccurate. In East Java, rice is evenly distributed to all 
households regardless of socioeconomic status. In Southeast Sulawesi, targeting is 
inaccurate in some areas due to even or alternating distribution and accurate in other 
areas where the rice is only distributed to poor households. 
 
7. There have been several changes to the allocation of rice for each beneficiary household. 
The document review shows that when the stipulated allocation of rice was 20 kg per 
beneficiary household, beneficiaries received varied amounts that were generally below 
the stipulated levels, with some recipients only receiving two liters. The analysis of 
Susenas data shows that Raskin rice has been distributed to up to two or three times more 
beneficiaries than targeted, which has resulted in each household receiving less than the 
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stipulated amount of rice. The results of field visits show that in 2007, with the stipulated 
amount of 10 kg, beneficiaries do not always receive their full allocation, with differences 
between the sample regions. In West Sumatra beneficiaries generally receive the correct 
allocation of 10 kg, while in East Java they only receive 4–7 kg and in Southeast Sulawesi 
they receive 4–10 kg. 
 
8. In theory, beneficiaries should receive Raskin rice each month, except in 2005 when it 
was determined that beneficiaries were to receive it only 10 times in a year. However, in 
practice, several documents show that beneficiaries do not receive the Raskin rice every 
month, and some have only received it once during a year. Results of the Susenas data 
analysis show that in 2003, beneficiaries only received Raskin rice five times over the 
course of a year on average. Field findings show that the frequency varies between 
regions. In West Sumatra and East Java, households generally received rice every month 
over a year, while in Southeast Sulawesi households received rice every 1–4 months. 
 
9. The General Guidelines stipulate that the price of Raskin rice at the distribution point is 
Rp1,000 per kilogram. The results of document review show that beneficiaries have paid 
between Rp1,000 and Rp2,900 per kilogram. The Susenas data analysis shows that 
beneficiaries paid more than the stipulated rate of Rp1,000 per kilogram, and the average 
price paid increases from year to year: Rp1,160 per kilogram in 2004, Rp1,225 per 
kilogram in 2005, and by 2006 it had risen to Rp1,253 per kilogram. Field findings show 
that the varying prices between regions were caused by the difference in cost of 
transporting rice from the distribution points that Bulog delivered the rice to (hereafter 
referred to as primary distribution points if distinction is necessary) to the points from 
where rice was distributed to beneficiaries (secondary distribution points) and by the 
different policies used by local implementers. In West Sumatra, the established price was 
around Rp1,200–1,300 per kilogram, in East Java Rp1,000 per kilogram, and in Southeast 
Sulawesi the price ranged between Rp1,000 and Rp1,440 per kilogram. 
 
 
C. Funding 
 
Since 2002, the program has been funded by the national budget (APBN) or government 
internal resources (rupiah murni). Moreover, some district/city governments allocate varying 
amounts of APBD funds to implement the Raskin program. Beneficiaries also contribute to 
program costs when they paid more than the stipulated rate. In general, the use of Raskin 
funds, whether sourced from the APBN, APBD, or the community, is still ineffective and 
inefficient. 
 
1. There have been several changes to the funding source of the Raskin program since the 
program was first implemented. During the first eight months, all program funding came 
from the APBN or rupiah murni. Following that until 2001, the program became part of 
the Social Safety Net program which was funded by the World Bank under the Social 
Safety Net Adjustment Loan (SSN-AL). Since 2002, the funding has again been taken 
from the APBN or rupiah murni. 
 
2. The APBN allocation for the Raskin program has increased from year to year, reaching 
Rp6.28 trillion (approximately USD690 million) in 2007. During 2002–2007, the majority 
of Raskin program funds from the APBN were spent on rice procurement (41–57%) and 
cost for carryover stock histories (22–43%). Other cost components were bank interest 
(7–9%), exploitation funds (5%), management fees (3%), and packaging costs (1–3%). In 
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this context, the APBN only funds program costs related to paying for rice from Bulog 
warehouses and getting it to distribution points. Regional governments are responsible 
for funding the operational costs of getting the rice from the distribution points to the 
beneficiaries through the APBD. 
 
3. The national average distribution cost for 2007 is around Rp173 per kilogram. The cost 
varies between regions, ranging from Rp105 per kilogram for Java and Rp1,855 for 
Papua. This includes not only transportation costs, but also supporting costs such as 
administration fees and the cost of reporting, program socialization, bonuses, official 
travel, and honorariums. 
 
4. Some district/city governments allocate APBD funds to cover the cost of their 
responsibility to distribute Raskin rice to beneficiaries from the distribution points. In 
West Sumatra, all district/city governments have provided funding in 2007 with varying 
amounts. As an example, Kabupaten Pasaman allocates Rp1.3 billion, while Kabupaten 
Agam only allocates Rp110 million. In East Java, only five districts provide such funding: 
Kabupaten Probolinggo (Rp62.8 million), Kabupaten Lamongan (Rp250 million), 
Kabupaten Lumajang (Rp112.7 million), Kabupaten Jember (Rp90 million), and 
Kabupaten Nganjuk (Rp156 million). In Southeast Sulawesi, not one district or city 
provides special funding for the implementation of the Raskin program. 
 
5. The document review on the effectiveness of the use of Raskin funds showed two main 
opinions. The first is that the use of Raskin program funds is inefficient and ineffective 
because (i) the program’s targeting is inaccurate, resulting in the leakage of funds to 
households that are not entitle to receive the benefit; (ii) the program’s operational costs 
are considered to be too high; and (iii) the difference between Bulog’s cost price in 
obtaining rice and its selling price is too high. In 2003, from Raskin’s budget of Rp4.83 
trillion, only 18% benefited poor households, 52% benefited nonpoor households, and 
30% was used for operational expenses and Bulog’s profit. In the same year, it only cost 
Bulog Rp2,790 per kilogram to procure the rice, while they sold it to the government for 
up to Rp3,343 per kilogram.  The second opinion states that the Raskin program is 
efficient as the operational or management costs are only 3%, lower than the operational 
or management costs for similar programs in other countries. 
 
6. Field findings support the opinion that the use of Raskin funds is ineffective and 
inefficient. This is shown by the inaccurate targeting and the allocation of honorariums 
to local officials. As an example, Bulog’s subregional divisions in several regions 
provided funds of Rp25,000 per distribution to each distribution point, while the 
subregional division of Bojonegoro gave an honorarium to several officials at a total cost 
of Rp2,060,000 per month, or Rp24,720,000 per year. APBD funds for the Raskin 
program in Kabupaten Agam were also used to pay honorariums to implementing 
officials at the subdistrict level. These kinds of practices not only caused inefficiencies 
but also violated the guidelines governing the use of Raskin funds. Implementing the 
Raskin program is part of the job description for the aforementioned officials; as such 
they should not receive additional honorariums. 
 
7. The Raskin program also uses funds from the beneficiaries inefficiently. In West Sumatra 
for example, transportation costs of around Rp200–300 per kilogram of rice have been 
imposed on Raskin beneficiaries when the real costs were only around Rp44–125 per 
kilogram. Distributors and other village officials divided the excess funds between 
The SMERU Research Institute, February 2008 xi 
themselves as profit. In this case, the beneficiaries “subsidized” the distributors, who 
were generally not categorized as poor. 
 
D. Capacity Building 
 
The Raskin program did not specifically include a capacity building aspect for implementing 
institutions or the community. Although Bulog has provided assistance through tertiary 
institutions, the capacity building for implementers was not effective. 
 
1. Document review results show that in 2005–2006, Bulog asked ten universities to 
conduct a study and provide assistance in 12 provinces. The assistance aimed to help 
program officers at the village/kelurahan or distribution point level with program 
socialization, targeting, and distribution. These activities did not effectively build the 
capacity of program implementers as they were focused more as research activities. 
Moreover, the areas that received assistances were very limited. For example, of the 900 
villages in West Sumatra, Andalas University only provided assistance in 6 
villages/kelurahan in 2005 and 12 villages/kelurahan in 2006. 
 
2. The field visits reveal that no efforts were made to give assistance to and to build the 
capacity of implementers or the beneficiaries in any of the three sample regions in 2007. 
 
 
E. Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Various groups, both internal and external, have conducted monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) activities of the Raskin program and have given various feedbacks for the program. 
However, the feedbacks have generally not been followed up and have not led to any positive 
change in the program’s implementation methods. Hence, the implementation of the Raskin 
program is still not effective. 
 
1. Results of the document review and field visits reveal that internal M&E is carried out in 
stages based on the level of government by the central, provincial, and district/city 
Raskin teams regularly or as required, in a limited number of sample regions. The internal 
M&E activities are part of the control for the program and are aimed at evaluating how 
effective the Raskin program’s implementation is according to the 6T performance 
indicators. However, in practice these M&E activities are conducted more like general 
investigations and complaint receiving exercises, and consequently have not achieved 
their intended objectives. Internal M&E activities have also tended to focus only on 
financial and administration aspects. 
 
2. Various institutions have conducted the external M&E, including universities, 
nongovernment organizations, research institutes, and international institutions. Most 
have evaluated the program’s implementational processes, while evaluations of the 
program’s impact are still limited and tend to look at the macro-level (i.e. national level) 
impact. In general, external M&E activities have provided information about program 
implementation on a case by case basis according to field findings and on a macro-scale 
based on analysis of secondary data.  
 
3. The field visit findings show that M&E activities in the sample areas do not reach the 
community level, stopping at the Raskin implementing officer at the subdistrict level. 
SMERU only found village- or community-level M&E activity in one sample village in 
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Southeast Sulawesi, but this was not extensive and was only in the form of a single visit 
by an NGO in 2007. 
 
4. The various M&E activities have resulted in feedbacks that resulted in some changes to 
the program regarding the data used as a targeting reference, the process of verifying 
beneficiaries through mudes, and the amount of rice allocated to each beneficiary. 
Nevertheless, any improvements to the program’s design have not been followed up 
properly during implementation. Consequently, the Raskin program continues to be 
implemented in an inefficient and ineffective manner. 
 
 
F. Program Audit 
 
Program audits are conducted routinely in accordance with national regulations. Bulog has 
responded to the audit results appropriately with regard to the problems and the auditor’s 
recommendations. 
 
1. Program implementation audits are regulated, inter alia, in Law No. 15, 2004 on State 
Financial Responsibility Management Audit and the annually revised Minister of Finance 
Regulation on Bulog's Budget. The BPKP (the Financial and Development Supervisory 
Board) conducted the audits until 2004 and BPK (the State Audit Agency) took over the 
task in 2005. The two institutions have audited different aspects of the program: BPKP 
focused on aspects concerning the achievement of the program’s implementation targets 
while BPK emphasizes on financial aspects. 
 
2. The results of the 2004 BPKP audit show that in 2003, the Raskin program’s 
implementation performance at the national level reached 78.2% (from the ideal of 
100%). Raskin’s performance on the targeted number of poor households only reached 
59.4%. Performance on the amount of rice distributed to targeted households was only 
61.42% and only 68.5% on correct price. BPKP also found that distribution transaction 
documents were not sufficiently detailed, that a number of district/city governments had 
still not published technical guidelines, and the monitoring of rice distribution was weak. 
 
3. The 2006 BPK audit on Bulog's rice procurement and storage expenses for FY2004 
found several basic accounting errors. Before the audit, Bulog's claim to the government 
for procurement and storage expenses reached Rp350 billion, but after the audit, the 
total figure changed to Rp249 billion—a negative correction of Rp101 billion (29%). 
This correction was necessary as Bulog had included other costs in the rice procurement 
and storage expenses. Bulog followed up the results of the audit in line with the findings 
and the auditor’s recommendations, which included creating guidelines for goods/service 
procurement and sending reminder notices to regional governments with Raskin-related 
outstanding payments. 
 
 
G. Complaints and the Complaint Handling System  
 
The complaints secretariats are ineffective as the community is not generally aware of their 
existence. Community members usually lodge any complaints with local implementers or 
village/kelurahan officials. Almost all complaints have not been resolved. 
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1. In accordance with the Raskin General Guidelines, the Raskin program provides a 
community complaints secretariat at the provincial and district levels. The results of the 
document review reflect that the existence of the secretariats has not been socialized to 
the community and consequently they do not know where they should go to register 
their complaints. 
 
2. Even when there are problems, the community does not officially file their complaints. If 
community members have complaints, they usually lodge them with a village/kelurahan 
official or with a local implementer, and almost all complaints are not resolved. In general, 
complaints are not passed on to higher levels, except if they are related to rice quality. 
 
3. The field findings support the results of the document review. 
 
 
H. Level of Satisfaction and Program Benefits 
 
Program implementers generally stated that they are not satisfied with the performance of the 
Raskin program, while beneficiaries generally stated that they are satisfied as they obtain a 
direct benefit from the program. 
 
1. The document review reveals that not a single regional government expressed 
satisfaction regarding Raskin’s implementation. Instead, many stated that the regional 
governments are not satisfied with the program’s implementation as it is not inline with 
the program objectives. One village official had complained that the program has 
negatively impacted the community’s spirit of mutual cooperation (gotong-royong) and 
creativity. Although beneficiaries considered the program’s targeting to be inaccurate, 
they considered Raskin’s service quality to be satisfactory. 
 
2. Field visits results show that various informants from the provincial level down to the 
village/kelurahan level assessed several aspects of the program's implementation as still 
weak, primarily the socialization of the program to the community, targeting, and the less 
than functional complaints mechanism. 
 
3. Although regional government officials are not satisfied with Raskin’s implementation, 
they have differing attitudes towards the program's continuation. In East Java, some 
officials are of the opinion that the program does not need to be extended as its impact 
does not justify the cost, whereas in West Sumatra and Southeast Sulawesi, some regional 
government officials are of the opinion that the program is still needed to help provide 
food for poor households. 
 
4. The results of FGDs with beneficiaries reveal that the most satisfying aspects of Raskin's 
implementation are price, payment methods, and distribution. Although a high 
proportion of beneficiaries pay more than Rp1,000 per kilogram for the rice, they do not 
object as it is still much cheaper than the market price, which was around Rp4,200 per 
kilogram during the field visits in August 2007. 
 
5. The FGDs with beneficiaries reveal that the most unsatisfying aspects of the program are 
the monitoring system, complaints system, and the amount of rice. The community was 
not satisfied with the program monitoring since there had not been any monitoring 
activities in their region since the program was started. They were not satisfied with the 
complaints system as they were unaware of the community complaints secretariats and 
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the official complaints mechanisms. The community was also not satisfied with the 
amount of rice they received as it was far below their household needs.    
 
6. The document review results reveal that Raskin is beneficial for beneficiaries because it 
can lessen their economic and rice need burdens and improve the quantity and quality of 
their consumption. It does this by providing in-kind income transfer to beneficiaries 
worth Rp20,500 per month, based on the assumption of a total transfer of benefits 
worth Rp3.25 trillion per year and of a total number of 13.2 million beneficiaries. In 
addition, Raskin is considered to be able to increase poor households’ access to rice. 
 
7. The analysis of the field findings results shows that the economic benefit of Raskin for 
beneficiary households from income transfer is relatively small because both the amount of 
rice that households receive and the frequency at which they receive it are below the 
stipulated levels. Moreover, beneficiaries often pay more than the stipulated price. 
Theoretically, each month Raskin beneficiaries would receive a subsidy equal to the 
difference between the market price and Raskin rice price of rice per kilogram multiplied 
by ten. At the time of the study, the average market price of medium quality rice was 
Rp4,200 per kilogram. Using this as a guide, beneficiary households should be receiving a 
subsidy of Rp32,000 per month or Rp384,000 per year. In practice however, income 
transfer to beneficiary households in the sample areas ranges between Rp12,800–Rp29,000 
per month or Rp38,400–Rp348,000 per year.  This is because beneficiaries pay Rp1,000–
Rp1,440 per kg, receive 4–10 kg, with a distribution frequency of 3–12 times per year. 
 
8. FGD participants mentioned several kinds of benefits they receive from Raskin. The 
three primary benefits of Raskin are assistance with food expenses, peace of mind for 
beneficiaries and their families, and assistance with school fees. Raskin reduces food 
expenses, so beneficiaries can have extra income that can be used for other necessary 
expenses such as school fees. Moreover, the FGD participants also mentioned that the 
Raskin program is able to hold back price fluctuations at the village level. 
 
 
I. Lessons Learned 
 
Both negative and positive lessons can be drawn from the findings of this study in order to 
determine how successful the Raskin program has been in achieving its objectives. 
 
1. Positive Lessons 
a. Targeting accuracy is highly dependent on the level of commitment and roles of the 
regional government and implementers at the local level, socialization which stresses 
that the Raskin program is only for the poor households, the use of BPS data that has 
been verified at the local level, and the transparency of the list of beneficiaries. 
 
b. Price accuracy is dependent on whether or not rice is distributed directly to recipients 
from (primary) distribution points, the distance between the (primary) distribution 
point and the beneficiaries, and the size of the contribution from the APBD. 
 
2. Negative Lessons 
a. The shortfall between the total allocation of RTM and the total number of RTM has 
caused targeting inaccuracies as well as inaccuracies in the amount of rice distributed 
to beneficiaries and distribution frequency. 
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b. Targeting inaccuracy is influenced by weak socialization, community indifference, the 
lack of commitment from regional governments, and the shortfall in total rice 
allocation compared to the total number of RTM. 
 
c. The regional government’s lack of commitment is influenced by their saturation with 
the already long-running program which has become routine, program 
implementation that does not reflect the objectives, and weak socialization. 
 
d. Price inaccuracy is influenced by whether or not rice is distributed from the primary 
distribution point or a secondary distribution point, and how far the distribution point 
is from household beneficiaries. 
 
e. Distribution delays are caused by outstanding payments from the distribution points. 
 
f. Distribution delays affect the community’s readiness to allocate the time and prepare 
the funds to purchase the rice. 
 
g. The accuracy of distribution frequency and amount of rice that beneficiaries receive is 
not always a good indication of successful program implementation. Distribution 
frequency may be correct every month, but the amount of rice received may be below 
the stipulated amount, or vice versa. 
 
 
J. Recommendations 
 
The Raskin program has been running for nine years and has used a significant amount of 
funds and involved many parties, but it is still not performing effectively. Therefore, Raskin 
should only be continued if the following conditions are met. 
 
a. The program needs to be revitalized. This can be done by implementing a guided 
national information campaign (socialization) to increase the awareness and real 
understanding of the program’s essence for all stakeholders, including local 
implementing agencies and the community. These socialization activities must be clearly 
regulated in Raskin’s General Guidelines. 
 
b. The allocation for beneficiary households at the national level must be firmly stipulated 
and in accordance with the total number of households in the targeted group. The target 
household category must be clearly defined, including whether it is limited to very poor 
households only or is to include poor or near poor households. 
 
c. One institution must be appointed to oversee those responsible for the distribution of 
rice starting from procurement down to distribution to the community in order to clarify 
the respective tasks, responsibilities, and performance evaluation.  
 
d. Local governments must be responsible for dividing rice allocation and ensuring accurate 
targeting of beneficiaries. To ensure accurate targeting, regional governments should 
verify the BPS data on RTM or other data which is used to determine targets at the 
national level.  
 
e. The maximum number of beneficiary households determined by verification at the 
village/kelurahan level must correspond to the total allocation the village has obtained in 
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order to guarantee that each household receives the stipulated amount of rice. The 
subdistrict should be responsible for formally approving and validating the list of 
targeted households. 
 
f. Arrangements must be made for (primary) distribution points to be located closer to 
household beneficiaries so they can distribute rice directly to beneficiaries.  
 
g. A policy is needed to force regional governments to seriously support Raskin 
implementation through both providing funding support (through the APBD) and 
helping to achieve the program objectives. 
 
h. An incentive and penalty system should be introduced and implemented to ensure that 
the program is implemented in accordance with the guidelines. A reward should be given 
to regions or program implementers that successfully implement the program in line with 
the regulations, based on a set of predetermined indicators. Incentives could be in the 
form of an award, while penalties could take the form of media announcements 
identifying unsuccessful regions, or the dismissal, transfer of duties, or demotion of the 
implementing officials. 
 
i. A serious, planned, and accountable practice of monitoring and evaluation activities by 
independent and credible external institutions will help to guarantee the appropriate 
implementation of Raskin and will support the incentive and penalty system. The results 
of monitoring activities must be widely presented to various parties including the public 
and systematically used for the improvement of the program’s implementation. 
 
j. All stipulations regarding the program’s implementation, such as those concerning 
socialization, targeting (verification and data reference), and monitoring and evaluation 
must be clearly regulated in the program’s guidelines. 
 
If those conditions are not met, Raskin should be ended and in-depth studies, including on 
the following aspects, will be required: 
a. the impact of Raskin’s phase out on the food security of poor households; 
b. the transfer of Raskin funds to another program that will provide better assistance 
for poor households; and   
c. Bulog’s role in the procurement and stabilization of the national price of rice, as 
currently more than 80% of the rice procured by Bulog has been distributed through 
the Raskin program. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Raskin (rice for poor households) is a national program that aims to help households to fulfill 
their food needs and reduce their financial burden through the provision of subsidized rice. 
Since 2007 the Raskin program has been coordinated by the Coordinating Minister for the 
People’s Welfare. The Logistics Agency (Bulog) is responsible for distributing the rice to the 
distribution points, while local governments are responsible for channeling the rice from the 
distribution points to poor households.  
 
In 2007 the Raskin program aimed to supply 1.9 million tons of rice to 15.8 million poor 
households. Each targeted household was to receive 10 kilograms (kg) of rice per month at the 
price of Rp 1,000 per kilogram at the distribution point.1 The total budget of Rp 6.28 billion 
was funded by  the national budget (APBN).   
 
The Raskin program is a continuation of the Special Market Operation (OPK), which was 
launched in July 1998 as part of the Social Safety Net (JPS). The program has been evaluated 
several times since 1998, and the findings have provided feedback for how the program’s 
concept and implementation could be improved. Various adjustments have been made, 
including changes to the program name, the quota of rice per household, distribution 
frequency, the sources and types of data on targeted beneficiaries, and the designation of 
institutions to provide assistance to local implementers. 
 
In 2002, the central government changed the name of the program from OPK to Raskin in 
order to reflect the change in the program’s nature; whilst initially the program was an 
emergency program intended to overcome the impact of the economic crisis, it had since 
become part of the social protection program for poor households. The monthly quota of rice 
per poor household, which was originally set at 10 kg but in subsequent years varied between 
10 kg and 20 kg, once again became 10 kg in 2007. In 2006, the distribution frequency, which 
had previously been 12 times per year, was reduced to 10 times per year, but in 2007 it was 
again raised to 12 times per year. The method of targeting beneficiaries was also changed in 
2006. Targeting had previously relied on data for preprosperous (KPS) families and prosperous 
level-1 (KS-1) families collected by the National Family Planning Coordinating Board 
(BKKBN). Since 2006, Statistics Indonesia (BPS) data for poor households collected in the 
PSE-052 has been used.  
 
In addition to these changes and in an attempt to improve the performance of the program, 
Bulog worked together with ten national universities in 2005 and 2006 to provide assistance 
teams for the implementation of Raskin in 12 provinces. 
 
Even though the government has endeavored to improve both the concept and 
implementation of Raskin, many still question the program’s effectiveness. In light of this, the 
                                                
1Conceptually, the distribution points are the places in villages and kelurahan at which the rice is handed over to 
the persons handling distribution and which can be accessed by beneficiaries, or other places whose locations are 
determined on the basis of a written agreement between the local government and Bulog  (2007 Raskin General 
Guidelines). 
2The PSE-05 (2005 Household Socioeconomic Survey) was initially intended to identify target beneficiaries for 
the Direct Cash Transfer (SLT) Program. 
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National Development Planning Board (Bappenas), with the support of the World Bank and 
the Decentralization Support Facility (DSF), has conducted an independent evaluation to study 
the effectiveness of the implementation of the Raskin program. The SMERU Research 
Institute, which has conducted a number of studies on Raskin, was given the task of 
undertaking this evaluation.  
 
 
1.2 Study Aim  
 
The general aim of this study is to investigate the extent to which the implementation of the 
Raskin program has been effective and to examine implementation practices so as to obtain 
lessons relevant to program improvement. More specifically, this study seeks to answer the 
following main questions:  
• Has implementation achieved the purpose of the program?  
• Has the program reached the poorest members of the community?  
• How have program monitoring, evaluation, and auditing been carried out? 
• How is program funding structured and how effective is it? 
• What is the level of stakeholder satisfaction with program implementation? 
• How beneficial has the program been for the community?  
 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
The present study was conducted over a period of five months from July to November 2007. 
The main activity of the study was an examination of documents and secondary data analyses 
(meta-evaluation). To complement meta-evaluation activities and at the same time obtain the 
most recent information, the study was supported by interviews with key informants at the 
central level and field research.  
 
In meta-evaluation activities, SMERU researchers examined 44 documents consisting of 7 
Raskin General Guidelines, 23 research and evaluation reports made by a number of 
institutions, 4 audit reports, 4 presentations, 3 articles and 3 ministerial regulations. Although 
these documents were published throughout the implementation of Raskin, the majority (73%) 
appeared in the 2004–2007 period (Table 1). A document review examined a number of 
decrees and circulars issued by governors, district heads, subdistrict heads and village/kelurahan 
heads and of the results of village consultative meetings (musyawarah desa or mudes). In data 
analysis, SMERU researchers examined secondary data from Susenas for the years 2002−2006 
as well as data from Bulog.  
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Table 1. Type and Number of Documents  
Year of Publication Type of Document 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total 
General guidelines   1 1 1 1     1 1 1 7 
Research and 
evaluation reports  1 2 1 1 1 1 3 2 9 2 23 
Presentation materials - - - - - - - 2 2 - 4 
Articles - - - - - 1 - 1 1 - 3 
Ministerial Regulations  - - - - - - - 1 1 1 3 
Audit Reports - - - - - - 2 - 2 - 4 
Total 1 3 2 2 2 2 5 7 16 4 44 
Interviews with key informants at the central level were conducted with several stakeholders, 
such as government institutions, research institutes, universities, and nongovernment 
organizations (NGO). A question guide was used to in the interviews to gain in-depth 
information about the implementation of Raskin and to discuss the results of research and 
evaluation carried out by the institution concerned. 
To obtain the latest information about Raskin’s implementation, SMERU researchers 
conducted field studies in three provinces between 20 and 30 August 2007. One district 
(kabupaten) was selected in each province: Kabupaten Agam (West Sumatra), Bojonegoro 
District (East Java), and Kolaka District (Southeast Sulawesi). The three districts were chosen 
purposively based on variations in location, level of rice production, Raskin rice allocation, 
poverty level, and availability of an accompanying institution from a university (Table 2).  
Table 2. Selection Criteria for Sample Provinces 
Province 
Production 
of Rice 
2005 
(tonnes) 
Raskin 
Allocation 
2006 
(tonnes)  
Proportion of 
Beneficiary 
Households 
2006  
(%) 
Poverty 
Level  
 2004 
(%) 
Accompanying 
University  
2005–2006 
 
Java 
East Java  9,007,285  285,917  51.68 20.08 Brawijaya University Malang 
Outside Java (western and eastern) 
West Sumatra  1,907,390  22,060  23.68 10.46 Andalas University Padang 
Southeast Sulawesi 339,847  19,199  59.22 21.89 None 
In each sample district, one subdistrict (kecamatan) that received a fairly high and regular 
allocation of Raskin rice and at the same time had a high level of poverty was chosen. Two 
villages3/kelurahan were selected in each subdistrict: one an urban or semiurban location or 
otherwise located close to the subdistrict capital, and the other a in rural location or otherwise 
far from the subdistrict capital. In all, field studies involved visits to six sample 
villages/kelurahan (Table 3). 
                                                
3In West Sumatra villages are called nagari. 
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Table 3. Location of Raskin Field Studies 
Province District Subdistrict Village/Kelurahan 
Maninjau 
West Sumatra  Agam Tanjung Raya 
Tanjung Sani 
Ngasem 
East Java Bojonegoro Ngasem 
Jelu 
Wolulu 
Southeast Sulawesi  Kolaka Watubangga 
Sumber Rejeki 
 
During field visits the research team used several rapid survey methods such as direct 
observation, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs). Observations made at 
the community level involved, among other things, taking note of local living conditions, 
especially those of respondents. In-depth interviews were conducted with a number of 
stakeholders at the provincial, district, subdistrict, and village/kelurahan levels. Interviews were 
conducted with representatives from institutions such as Bulog regional divisions and 
subdivisions, government officials, universities, NGO, the local media, as well as local program 
administrators (the persons responsible for handling Raskin at the village level). In-depth 
interviews were also held with recipient households and nonrecipient households, selected 
purposively based on housing distribution considerations.  
A semi-structured interview guide was used in all interviews with informants and respondents. 
Interviews sought information covering a number of aspects related to the implementation of 
the Raskin program, such as socialization, allocation, targeting, distribution, amount of rice 
received, price of distributed rice, capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, the complaints 
system, satisfaction levels, and program usefulness.  
One FGD was conducted in each village/kelurahan, totaling six FGDs. Approximately 16 
beneficiaries attended each FGD. Participants consisted of roughly equal numbers of men and 
women (7–9 of each in each FGD) who normally purchase the rice or at least understand how 
Raskin is implemented in their village. All FGD participants were selected from separate 
households. The FGDs obtained information about the implementation of Raskin in the 
village concerned, participant knowledge about program management, satisfaction levels, and 
program usefulness.  
The data and information collected from the document review, in-depth interviews, and FGDs 
were analyzed using qualitative methods, while secondary data from the BPS Susenas were 
analyzed using quantitative methods.  
The study was carried out by seven SMERU researchers, consisting of two advisors, Sudarno 
Sumarto and Asep Suryahadi, and five researchers, namely, Hastuti, Sulton Mawardi, Bambang 
Sulaksono, Akhmadi and Silvia Devina. The study also involved one guest researcher, Rima 
Prama Artha, and three local researchers, namely, Joni Saputra (West Sumatra), Heri Rubianto 
(East Java) and Laode Udin (Southeast Sulawesi). SMERU’s librarian, Ratna Dewi, conducted 
the document review. 
The study findings are presented in four chapters. The introductory chapter describes the study 
background, objectives and methodology. The second chapter presents the findings 
concerning program implementation, covering the aspects of socialization, allocation, targeting, 
prices and payment, the funding structure, monitoring and evaluation, the auditing system, 
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complaint handling, levels of satisfaction, and the usefulness of the program. The third chapter 
presents the positive and negative lessons that have been drawn from the evaluation of the 
program implementation. The fourth and concluding chapter offers recommendations for the 
future implementation of the program.  
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II. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
Two agencies are responsible for the distribution of Raskin: Bulog and local government. 
Bulog is responsible for getting the rice to the distribution points, while the local government 
is responsible for distributing the rice from the distribution points to the target households. To 
date, Bulog has performed its task relatively well and in accordance with the implementation 
guidelines. This partial evaluation, however, cannot be used to evaluate the success of the 
program, as Raskin is a program that provides subsidized rice to poor households. Findings 
from the document review and field studies indicate that most of the problems associated with 
the implementation of Raskin occur between the distribution points and the recipient.  
 
According to the 2007 Raskin General Guidelines, there are six indicators (known as the 6 Ts) 
by which the level of Raskin success is measured, namely, accuracy in targeting, in amounts of 
rice, in pricing, in timing, in quality and in administration. On the whole, the results of the 
present study show that the effectiveness of Raskin program’s implementation has been poor. 
This can be seen from the lack of socialization and transparency; the inaccurate targeting of 
recipients; inaccurate pricing, amounts of rice, and frequency of rice distribution; the high cost 
of program management; deficient monitoring; and the poorly functioning complaints 
mechanism. The following sections present details of these problems. 
 
 
2.1 Program Implementation  
 
The performance of Raskin can be evaluated by looking at the aspects of socialization and 
transparency in information, allocations, targeting, distribution frequency, the amount of rice 
received by beneficiaries, rice prices and the payment system, and the use of funds. One way of 
measuring the performance of each of these aspects is to compare the extent to which the 
actual achievements revealed in information from the document review, the analysis of 
secondary data and field findings conform to Raskin’s General Guidelines. 
 
2.1.1 Socialization and Transparency in Information 
 
Socialization is one of the keys to successful program implementation. Nevertheless, the General 
Guidelines do not deal with this important activity in detail. For example, they do not clearly 
state the frequency and time of socialization at each level of government or at the community 
level, nor do they state who is responsible for implementing and funding the activity. Detailed 
rules should have been set down in the instructions for program implementation (juklak) 
prepared by provincial and district/city governments. Only a limited number of local 
governments prepared instructions for the program’s implementation. Even in cases where such 
instructions have been prepared, the contents are merely a copy of the General Guidelines 
without any further detailed stipulations about various aspects, including socialization. The 
absence of any such stipulations, among others, has led to regional variations in socialization 
activities for local government officials and has caused the weak socialization to the community. 
This weak socialization has caused a lack of program transparency among the community. 
 
According to the 2007 Raskin General Guidelines, the purpose of socialization (or the 
dissemination of information) of the program is for the community, and specifically poor 
members of the community, to learn about the background, implementation mechanism, 
community rights and obligations, and complaints mechanism. Information can be 
disseminated through coordination and socialization meetings, the mass media, and other 
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means such as booklets, brochures and stickers. Additional informal socialization can be 
carried out through revolving credit groups (arisan), customary (adat) gatherings, and religious 
gatherings. 
 
Socialization among the bureaucracy  
 
According to the documents, socialization among those responsible for implementation in local 
government circles depends on a structural approach within the bureaucracy, that is, in a tiered 
manner down to the district or subdistrict levels. There were no specific meetings to socialize the 
program; rather it was discussed in general coordination meetings (rakor) (Anak Bangsa Peduli 
2005: 33, 40; LP3ES 2000: 51; Institute for Empowerment and Development Studies 2005: 71–72). 
There is the impression among the bureaucracy that socialization is not an important aspect 
because Raskin is merely a follow-up program to the OPK. Consequently, there is no specific 
agenda for socialization; rather it is based upon need (Hastuti and Maxwell 2003:12). 
 
Field studies in the three sample districts show that coordination meetings are held at each 
level of government, from the provincial down to the village/kelurahan levels. At the provincial 
level these meetings are usually held twice a year. One of these is held at the beginning of 
program implementation, where the division of supplies to districts/cities is also discussed; a 
second meeting is held in the middle or at the end of the year to plan the program for the 
following year and at the same time to evaluate the current year’s program. These meetings are 
attended by persons from the agencies on the provincial Raskin team as well as representatives 
of district/city governments. 
 
At the level of the sample districts, implementation for coordination meetings varies and 
depends on the respective local governments, but at the very least a meeting is held at the 
beginning of program implementation to specifically discuss the division of supplies to each 
subdistrict and village/kelurahan. In Kabupaten Agam, coordination meetings are conducted at 
the beginning and end of the year. In addition, a routine quarterly meeting is held between the 
Bulog subdivision and Raskin administrators from the district government level. Raskin 
implementation and problems associated with the program are also discussed at every meeting 
of the district poverty eradication team. In Bojonegoro District, a coordination meeting is 
conducted twice a year but additional meetings are usually held if particular problems or topics 
need to be discussed. In Kolaka District, a coordination meeting is held only at the beginning 
of program implementation. This district-level meeting is normally attended by the district 
Raskin team and representatives from the subdistricts. 
 
Not all subdistricts conducted socialization activities in 2007. Tanjung Raya in Kabupaten 
Agam was the only sample subdistrict to carry out socialization at the beginning of the year of 
the program’s implementation. The participants, who were all village heads (known locally as 
wali nagari) and neighborhood heads (known locally as wali jorong), met together to discuss the 
system of distributing the rice and the method used to determine the selling price to 
beneficiaries. At the village/kelurahan level, annual socialization is not conducted because 
Raskin is regarded as a long-running program that does not undergo much change from year to 
year. If any socialization meetings are held, usually only village officials and community leaders 
attend, without community involvement. 
 
The document review shows that socialization activities in the form of dissemination of the 
Raskin General Guidelines are generally limited to the district/city level (Lembaga Demografi 
FEUI 2003: 33–34; PT Daya Makara UI 2006: 85). Although there are provinces and 
districts/cities that have prepared instructions for the implementation of Raskin, distribution 
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of these instructions does not extend to lower levels of government (Lembaga Demografi 
FEUI 2003: 33–34). Field study findings also reveal that the distribution of the General 
Guidelines is very limited. Although some sample regions have prepared instructions for 
implementation, namely, the provinces of East Java and Southeast Sulawesi and the district of 
Kolaka, distribution does not reach down to the village/kelurahan level. As a result, program 
implementation at the village/kelurahan level normally depends more on verbal instructions 
issued at subdistrict or district level meetings. The same is also true at the community level; 
local distributors, who are actually spearheading the Raskin program implementation for 
households, are usually guided only by verbal instructions that are normally issued informally 
by the village/kelurahan head or the subdistrict staff. 
 
At the same time, information channels like community service announcements on television 
and the distribution of brochures or posters, which were common several years ago, are no 
longer used. The community members who were respondents in the present study have never 
even heard of the brochures or posters that should have been placed in public places. A study 
carried out by Anak Bangsa Peduli (2006: 40) in West Java reveals that socialization by local 
governments through the mass media only occurred in Garut District, which used the printed 
media and the radio. Andalas University (2006: 3-6) reported that in West Sumatra socialization 
had at one time been carried out in the form of interactive dialogue on TVRI and through the 
printed media.  
 
Socialization among the community  
 
It was concluded from a review of a number of documents that socialization of the Raskin 
program among the community varies and on the whole is not optimal. The findings of a 
previous SMERU study indicate that at the village level there is no special socialization among 
the community (Fillaili et al 2007: 70). According to Andalas University, not one of the 12 
villages for which assistance was provided had previously undertaken socialization (2006: 3-15). 
Brawijaya University stated that in Madiun District, a large number of villages did not 
undertake socialization, at 42% (2006: 61). The field findings show that there has never been 
any formal socialization among the communities in any of the sample villages/kelurahan. 
 
Variations in socialization activities caused variations in the sources of information about the 
program for the community. The village/kelurahan head is the initial source of information for 
the community, but information is generally forwarded informally and indirectly. According to 
LP3ES, the responsibility to pass on information about the program to the target families is 
entrusted entirely to the village head (2000: 51). Brawijaya University reported the same 
findings (2006: 63–69). However, according to Hastuti and Maxwell the village head generally 
does not give information directly to the community but rather passes it on to the hamlet head, 
the neighborhood (RT) head or community figures (2003: 12). Fillaili et al found that the 
community learned about the Raskin program not from the head of the village/kelurahan but 
rather from the RT head, neighbors and television (2007: 92). The field study findings also 
show that generally the village head is not the direct source of information on the Raskin 
program. On the whole, the community obtained information from the persons who handled 
Raskin distribution, such as RT heads and Family Empowerment and Welfare Team (TP 
PKK).   
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Socialization activities to the community were usually below optimal levels, which meant that 
many members of the community, including beneficiaries, do not understand the program as a 
whole.4 Hastuti and Maxwell, for example, reported that the information given to the 
community is limited to implementation aspects, such as the quota of rice per family, the price 
per kilogram and the methods of cost collection and payment (2003: 13). Additionally, 
information about the purpose of the program and the targeting of poor families are not 
emphasized. As a consequence of the lack of information, the change in name from OPK to 
Raskin, which had been hoped to sharpen targeting, was pointless. At the time of their study, 
Raskin was still better known among the community as a government distribution of sembako 
(the nine basic foods/materials), which meant that families not included among the target 
households still demanded to receive a share (Hastuti and Maxwell 2003: 13).  
 
The field study findings similarly show that socialization is still weak and has not been carried 
out to the full, the result being that many people, including beneficiaries, do not understand 
the overall program. In fact, beneficiaries do not even have general information about the 
program, such as the meaning of the name Raskin, how much rice they should receive, the 
stipulated price of the rice at the distribution point, and the number of times per year that they 
should receive the rice. Nevertheless, the essence of the Raskin program as assistance in the 
form of rice from the government for poor households is understood by the wider 
community, even though this knowledge was not automatically applied in program 
implementation. 
 
Transparency of information 
 
The influence of limited socialization can be seen in the low level of program transparency to 
the community. Only one of the documents that were examined, stated that certain villages in 
one sample subdistrict placed information about Raskin on the village notice board (Brawijaya 
University 2006: 69). Efforts to provide transparency in the list of beneficiaries were reported 
in only a few documents. According to Hastuti and Maxwell, certain villages once had the list 
of recipients placed in the village head’s office, but it was torn down by persons who 
demanded to become beneficiaries (2003: 13). In other villages the list of names was 
deliberately not put up because it was feared that an announcement of this kind would give rise 
to community claims. Meanwhile, the Institute of Demography (FE-UI 2003: 89) and PT Daya 
Makara UI (2006: 87) reported that the list of poor households was intentionally not 
announced for security reasons and to prevent the occurrence of undesirable consequences. 
 
These findings are supported by the field findings, which indicate that no information about 
the Raskin program is posted in public places or in places accessible by the community in most 
of the study areas. Accessible lists of Raskin recipients were found only in the sample villages 
in Kabupaten Agam. Local distributors made the lists of beneficiaries available and it was 
planned to put them up very soon in local mosques, in accordance with local efforts to use the 
mosque to announce poverty reduction programs. 
 
Weaknesses in program socialization and transparency has caused a number of negative effects 
to emerge, including: (i) the potential for corruption due to a lack of community control as a 
consequence of the lack of understanding of the program (Olken, 2006: 856); (ii) inaccuracy in 
                                                
4This was also found in other studies, including Anak Bangsa Peduli (2006: 47), PT Daya Makara UI (2006: 84), 
Hastuti and Maxwell (2003: 13), IPB (2006: slide 19), Komisi IV DPR RI (2007: 10), Institute of Demography FE 
UI (2003: 89), Olken (dalam Journal of Public Economics 2006: 856), SMERU (1998: 8), Fillaili et al (2007: 70), 
Andalas University (2005: 3-16), Brawijaya University (2006: 60–68), and the University of Indonesia (2004: 160). 
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targeting because community members who are not poor have demanded a share of benefits 
(Universitas Indonesia 2004: 160); (iii) the appearance of complaints, criticisms, and unrest or 
conflict in the community (Anak Bangsa Peduli 2006: 47); and (iv) a perception on the part of 
local governments that Raskin is a central government program and is therefore not their 
responsibility (PT Daya Makara UI 2006: 84). This false perception on the part of local 
governments influences their commitment to supporting the program’s implementation, 
including the provision of funding support. 
 
2.1.2 Allocation Quotas and Target Households  
 
According to Susenas data for 2002–2006, the proportion of Raskin recipients from all 
households in Indonesia has fluctuated between 36% and 45%. In West Sumatra, the 
proportion ranged from 11% to 24%, in East Java from 41% to 53%, and in Southeast 
Sulawesi from 35% to 59% (Figure 1). These conditions are in line with the proportion of poor 
households in the respective regions.  
 
National decisions about the allocation of Raskin rice quotas are based on the availability of the 
budget for subsidies and on the number of target beneficiaries. At the national level, quotas are 
allocated to each province based on data on targeted beneficiaries after considering proposals 
submitted by the regional governments. After that, provincial governments decide on the 
allocation for each district and city, while the district and city governments subsequently 
determine the allocation for their respective subdistricts and villages/kelurahan. These shares are 
all set in proportion to the data for prospective recipients in each area. From the beginning of the 
OPK program until 2005, target beneficiaries were determined by the data for preprosperous 
(Pra-KS) families and prosperous-1 (KS-1) families obtained from the results of the BKKBN 
data collection,  but since 2006, BPS data on poor households (RTM) has been used. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Indonesia
West Sumatra
East Java
Southeast Sulawesi
 
Source: Susenas BPS 2002–2006 (processed) 
Figure 1. Proportion of Households Receiving Raskin in Indonesia and the Sample 
Provinces, 2002–2006  
The Raskin program is conducted throughout Indonesia without any distinction based on 
regional poverty level as poor households are found in all parts of the country. This is 
supported by the document review and data analysis. All regions, down to village/kelurahan 
level, receive a Raskin allocation. In actual implementation, however, some areas have not 
received Raskin for several months at a time. Hastuti and Maxwell found that some villages 
and subdistricts did not participate in the program for a long period of time—in some cases 
for more than a year (2003: 14–15). Reasons for this include being in arrears with payments, 
procedural deviations, or due to a request from the subdistrict. The subdistricts concerned 
regarded Raskin as a nuisance and felt that the rice that they received was not in proportion to 
the labor required and the risk that had to be borne. Fillaili et al also reported that as a 
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consequence of disruptions in Raskin payments at the kelurahan level, several subdistricts in 
Tangerang did not submit proposals for Raskin rice allocations during 2004–2005 (2007: 77).  
Table 4. Number of Households and National Raskin Allocations 
Total Households  
Year Total Number of 
Poor Households* 
Target 
Households   
Target Households 
as % of Total 
Number 
Allocation 
(tonnes) 
2000 16,000,000 7,500,000 46.88 1,350,000 
2001 15,000,000 8,700,000 58.00 1,501,274 
2002 15,135,561 9,790,000 64.68 2,349,600 
2003 15,746,843 8,580,313 54.49 2,059,276 
2004 15,746,843 8,590,804 54.56 2,061,793 
2005 15,791,884 8,300,000 52.56 1,991,897 
2006 15,503,295 10,830,000 69.86 1,624,500 
2007 19,100,905 15,800,000 82.72 1,896,000 
Source: Bulog 
Note: * To 2005, data for poor families came from the BKKBN while in 2006 and 2007 BPS data was used 
The total national Raskin rice quota increased each year until 2002, after which it decreased, 
but in 2007 it rose again slightly. Meanwhile, the number of poor households that the program 
targeted has tended to increase from year to year. Although the proportion has risen, the total 
number of target households is still lower than the total number of poor households (Table 4). 
For example, in 2007 the total number of poor households was 19.1 million but the the Raskin 
program target was only 15.8 million poor households, which meant that 3.3 million poor 
households did not receive a Raskin allocation. The implications were apparent in 
implementation problems such as targeting, and inaccuracy in the amount of rice received by 
beneficiaries as well as distribution frequency.  
In the three study regions, the allocation quotas and the numbers of targeted poor households 
changed, but the trends differed as can be seen in Table 5. In West Sumatra, allocation quotas 
and the number of target households increased. The rise in allocations is explained by the shift 
from BKKBN to BPS data and the subsequent increase in the number of poor households. Up 
to the subdistrict level, the number of targeted poor households was smaller than the total 
existing number of poor households, but the opposite happened in the sample villages. This 
can be explained by the fact that adjustments at the subdistrict level were made to the 
allocations per village based on information from village and neighborhood heads. In the 
sample neighborhoods however, the slight reduction in the number of target households was 
not a problem because changes had occurred in the economic situation of households and 
because some poor households had moved away or household members had died. This is also 
true for the increases in the number of targeted poor households, since some poor households 
had not been registered as being poor.  
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Table 5. Raskin Allocations in Study Regions, 2005–2007 
2005 2006 2007  
Administrative 
Area 
Target 
Households 
Quantity of 
Rice 
(kg) 
Target 
Households 
Quantity of 
Rice 
(kg) 
Target 
Households 
Quantity of 
Rice 
(kg) 
Province of West 
Sumatra 
141,410 22,060,000 147,067 (233,695) 
22,060,000 302,640 
(312,640) 36,317,000 
Kabupaten Agam  8,995 1,702,120 11,453 (18,199) 
1,702,120 22,647 
(23,417) 2,717,640 
Kecamatan 
Tanjung Raya  863 138,080 1,718 171,800 
2,523 
(2,535) 302,760 
Nagari Maninjau  97 15,520 130 13,000 230 (226) 27,600 
Nagari Tanjung 
Sani  
222 35,520 375 37,500 544 (538) 65,280 
Province of East 
Java  
1,441,750 346,020,000 1,906,115 (3,236,871) 285,917,000 
2,653,598 
(3,236,880) 318,431,760 
Kabupaten 
Bojonegoro  108,950 26,148,000 
128,471 
(163,469) 19,271,000 134,142 16,096,996 
Kecamatan 
Ngasem  
  
11,580 
(11,580) 1,737,000 9,606 1,152,720 
Ngasem village 
  
491 
(491) 73,650 402 48,240 
Jelu village 
  
907 
(907) 136,050 861 103,320 
Province of 
Southeast 
Sulawesi  
230,045 25,304,950 239,987 (332,023) 19,198,960 
259,384 
(271,082) 23,344,560 
Kabupaten Kolaka 16,557 1,821,270 17,273 (33,294) 1,381,840 
20,689 
(29,455) 1,862,010 
Kecamatan 
Watubangga  
2,960 296,000 3,000 240,000 3,244 291,960 
Kelurahan Wolulu  126 12,600 126 12,600 143 14,300 
Sumber Rejeki 
village 
137 13,700 137 13,700 142 14,200 
Source: Decrees of governors, district heads, and subdistrict heads in the sample locations  
Note: Figures in parentheses are total existing poor households.  
In East Java the Raskin rice allocations experienced a fall in 2005–2006 but rose again in 2007. 
This, however, was not reflected in Bojonegoro District or in the sample subdistricts and 
villages in the same province. In these areas the 2007 allocation actually dropped by 
comparison with the amount provided in the previous year. This was caused by the small 
increase in the number or poor households in Bojonegoro district against the overall fall in the 
number of poor households in the sample subdistricts and villages in Bojonegoro in 2007. As 
in East Java, the Raskin rice allocation for Southeast Sulawesi was also reduced in 2005–2006 
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but rose again in 2007. In both East Java and Southeast Sulawesi, the quota for the number of 
targeted poor households was lower than the existing number of poor households. 
 
The document review showed that the shortfall caused several problems to emerge. The 
Institute of Demography) states that because the Raskin rice supply was insufficient for the 
total number of poor households the rice was distributed evenly, with beneficiaries taking turns 
to receive rice once every 2 to 3 months and with a reduction in the quota of rice per recipient 
(FEUI 2006: 47. The same thing has been reported by Anak Bangsa Peduli (2006: 12), PT 
Daya Makara UI (2006: 95), IPB (2006: slide 4), and the University of Indonesia (2004: 142, 
149, 161). Meanwhile, according to Brawijaya University, the shortfall in supply not only meant 
that recipients were given less than the stipulated amount of rice but also that it caused 
horizontal conflicts when the rice was distributed (2006: 38, 121). The Institute for 
Empowerment and Development Studies also reported that the fact that the supply was less 
than needed for the number of poor households created social jealousy and disharmony at the 
community level, at the same time causing difficulties for those handling village-level 
distribution when it came to prioritizing who most needed the rice (2005: 74). 
 
Field studies showed the same tendencies. The shortfall in the amount of rice supplied was 
used as an excuse by local-level program administrators to deviate from the official 
mechanisms for distributing the rice and determining targets. These deviations, which included 
reducing distribution frequency, rotating recipients, increasing the number of recipients and 
distributing the rice evenly, ultimately meant that target households did not receive the 
stipulated amount of rice. Deviations were also encouraged by inaccuracies in BPS data, that is, 
poor households that were not registered while on the other hand non-poor households that 
were registered as being poor. 
 
2.1.3 Determination of Target Beneficiaries   
 
Village consultative meetings (mudes) 
 
According to the 2006-2007 Raskin General Guidelines, the BPS list of poor households, 
which represents data for the target households intended to benefit from the program, is to 
be used as the basis for setting allocations down to village/kelurahan level. At this level, a 
village consultative meeting is used to determine beneficiaries. The meeting should be 
conducted in a transparent and participatory manner by involving the various components of 
the community, including representatives of poor households.  
 
The 2001–2005 Raskin General Guidelines states that village meetings to determine target 
households are to refer to data on target families, at that time BKKBN data for KPS and KS-1 
families. The 2006–2007 Raskin Guidelines, however, do not stipulate that the village meeting 
must refer to the BPS data on poor families. In fact, in the section entitled ‘Determination of 
Beneficiaries’, it is not stated that beneficiaries must be poor households. The absence of such 
a requirement can be used by program administrators as justification for distributing Raskin 
not only to poor households or for sharing it out equally, provided that the decision to do so is 
made during a village meeting. Although in the introduction to the Raskin General Guidelines 
it is stated that the Raskin program targets poor households, it is quite possible that program 
administrators do not use the guidelines in full, especially since, as stated above, distribution of 
the Raskin General Guidelines itself is still very limited and does not extend to those handling 
implementation at the community level. 
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The findings of the document review show that village consultative meetings are not held in all 
villages/kelurahan. Even in cases where such meetings were conducted, their implementation 
was still below optimum because there was insufficient community involvement and because 
on the whole the meetings did not seek to sharpen the targets. Andalas University reported 
that only one of the 12 villages (nagari) which they assisted had ever held a village meeting for 
this purpose and that the implementation was not complete (2006: 3-15). According to 
Hasanuddin University, not all villages/kelurahan have conducted village meetings to determine 
Raskin beneficiaries (2006: 40). In fact, IPB states that there have been virtually no village 
meetings for allocation, and, where there have been held, they have involved only the village 
head and the heads of villages and neighborhoods (RW and RT) (2006: slide 15). Brawijaya 
University reported that village meetings have been conducted in two sample districts, but in 
one other district only a few of the villages held such meetings (2006: 73, 79). According to 
Hastuti and Maxwell, discussions were held in some villages; however, only village staff 
participated and the discussions were only intended to justify that the decision-making process 
had proceeded in accordance with the stipulations  (2003: 40). University of Indonesia (2004: 
142, 150) and PT Daya Makara UI (2006: 86) had similar findings, both stating that village 
meetings did not actually involve the community and that village meetings, which was really to 
verify data, did not fully realize their intended function. In fact, Hastuti and Maxwell (2003: 
30), Andalas University (1999: IV-25) and the University of Indonesia (2004: 142) all reported 
cases of village meetings at which it was decided that the supply of rice should be shared out 
equally among all families, rich and poor alike. 
 
Field work revealed a situation fully in line with the findings of the document review. Of the six 
sample villages/kelurahan, only the two East Java villages held village consultative meetings. Even 
then, the aim of the meetings in these two villages was not to sharpen or verify the data concerning 
beneficiaries, but rather to decide that Raskin rice would be shared equally among all households. 
 
According to Brawijaya University, lack of funds and time limitations are the reason for why so 
many villages do not hold village meetings, or else they believe that it is sufficient for 
discussions to be held at subdistrict level (2006: 74). The Institute of Demography found that 
one reason for why village meetings are not conducted is that a list of recipients provided by 
BKKBN officials already exists (FEUI 2003: 86). 
 
Methods of determining beneficiaries   
 
As a consequence of the fact that village consultative meetings are not conducted in all areas 
and implementation is far from optimal, the method by which beneficiaries are determined 
varies from place to place. Some villages set targets through a village meeting, some use 
national reference data as the basis (BKKBN data or BPS data for poor households), and in 
some cases decisions are made by RT and RW heads or by village/kelurahan heads.5 In many 
cases these various methods ultimately result in a decision that the rice should be shared out 
equally among a greater number of households or among all households.6 The different 
                                                
5For the different methods in determining beneficiaries, see Hastuti and Maxwell (2003: 31–2), Institute for 
Empowerment and Development Studies (2005: 68), Brawijaya University (2006: 115), Hasanuddin University (2006: 
38–40), and USESE Foundation (2004: 47, 49, 53). 
6These cases were found in the following studies: Bulog (2006: 21), Hastuti and Maxwell (2003: 30), Institute for 
Empowerment and Development Studies (2005: 34, 46), IPB (2005: slide 28), IPB (2006 slide 15), Lembaga Demografi 
(FE-UI 2003: 17, 39, 70), Perdana and Maxwell  (2004: 27), PT Daya Makara UI (2006: 27), Fillaili et al (2007: 95), 
Andalas University (1999: IV-25), Bojonegoro University (2006: 46–47), Brawijaya University (2006: 41), Hasanuddin 
University (2006: 46–47), University of Indonesia (2004: 142, 151), and USESE Foundation (2004: 47). 
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reasons behind these decisions include prevention of conflict, insufficient supply of rice than is 
needed for the number of poor households, avoidance of social jealousy, the existence of 
demands from persons who were not entitled to receive the rice, and the need to reach 
deadlines for the sale and payment of the rice.7  
 
Field studies also revealed variations in the ways in which beneficiaries are determined. In 
Kabupaten Agam, West Sumatra, the local government has put pressure on all Raskin 
administrators to use the BPS list of poor households. In the sample villages, program 
administrators at the community level have adjusted the list with the agreement of the village 
head because they regard the BPS data as inaccurate. They have adjusted the lists of 
beneficiaries by asking relatively well-off households to transfer their quota to unregistered 
poorer households. In some cases replacement of beneficiaries is done with the knowledge of 
the registered poor households although not routinely in each distribution. There are also 
those who make adjustments by increasing the number of recipients in such a way that 
beneficiaries obtain Raskin rice in alternate months or else they receive only a small quota of 
rice. Distributors at the village/kelurahan level select replacement or additional recipients after 
considering the socioeconomic situation of the households in question. 
 
The sample villages in East Java conduct village consultative meetings involving the community. 
However, these meetings are held only to decide that Raskin rice will be shared out equally among 
all households, without taking the economic status of the individual households into account. In 
one hamlet, only public servants, members of the army or police force and pensioned individuals 
are excluded from the equal distribution because they are considered to have a regular income and 
to be financially well-off. The policy of distributing equal shares is intended to prevent any social 
tension as a consequence of demands by nonpoor members of the community who believe that 
Raskin rice is a “gift” from the government and hence every household has the right to receive it. 
 
In the sample villages in Southeast Sulawesi, the Raskin rice distribution system differs from 
one village to another and even from one neighborhood to another. In Kelurahan Wolulu, 
officials in one neighborhood have applied a system of equal distribution among all households 
in an attempt to prevent any conflict and tension among residents, meaning that beneficiaries 
do not receive the full Raskin rice quota. In another neighborhood, a rotational system has 
been applied, which means that recipients do not receive rice every month. In the village of 
Sumber Rejeki, Raskin rice was only divided among a set number of beneficiaries in keeping 
with quota, determination of which referred to BKKBN data. 
 
Accuracy in targeting 
 
Several documents have concluded that the determination of target beneficiaries is the main 
weakness of the Raskin program because not all poor households receive Raskin rice while 
many nonpoor households do. The University of Indonesia came to the conclusion that in 
terms of effectiveness in implementation, Raskin has many problems related to targeting 
accuracy (2004: 159). Hasanuddin University stated that the problem with beneficiary targeting 
is still the main issue because there are poor households that do not receive Raskin rice and vice 
versa (2006: 35). The same finding was expressed by Andalas University, which stated that one 
                                                
7These reasons were stated in the following studies: Bulog (2006: 21, 27, 29), Institute for Empowerment and 
Development Studies (2005: 46–47), Institute of Demography (FEUI 2003: 39, 47, 70, 78), Perdana and Maxwell  
(2004: 28), PT Daya Makara UI (2006: 86), Fillaili et al (2007: 95), Andalas University (1999: IV-25), Bojonegoro 
University (2006: 46), Brawijaya University (2006: 113, 133), University of Indonesia (2004: 136, 142), and USESE 
Foundation (2004: 49, 51). 
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of the weaknesses of the Raskin program is the fact that there are nonpoor recipient families 
that receive the rice (2005: 3-16).  According to Sumarto and Suryahadi, Raskin reached 52.6% 
of poor households but the number of nonpoor households that benefited was also relatively 
high at 36.9% (2001: 13). The World Bank has even reported that more nonpoor than poor 
households receive Raskin rice (2006: 215). A number of other documents contain similar 
statements regarding inaccurate targeting.8 
 
The results of the secondary data analyses point to the same conclusion. The analysis of Raskin  
targets and achievements in Table 6 shows that according to both Bulog and Susenas (BPS) 
data for 2002–2006, Raskin rice was distributed to a greater number of recipients than the 
number of target households. According to Bulog data, the ratio of recipient households to 
target households ranged from 128% to 147%, while data from Susenas indicate that the 
proportion was between 214% and 284% or approximately two to three times greater.  
Table 6. Raskin Beneficiaries: Targets and Achievements 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
No. of poor households 15,135,561 15,746,843 15,746,843 15,791,884 15,503,295 
Target recipients (poor households)  9,790,000 8,580,313 8,590,804 8,300,000 10,830,000 
Achievements: 
No. of recipients:   
▪ Bulog data 
▪ BPS data 
Ratio of BPS data to  Bulog data 
 
14,355,227 
20,943,085 
1.46 
 
11,832,87 
22,519,131 
1.90 
 
11,664,050 
20,063,738 
1.72 
 
11,109,274 
23,552,956 
2.12 
 
13,882,731 
25,147,329 
1.70 
% recipients from poor households  
▪ Bulog data 
▪ BPS data 
 
94.84 
138.37 
 
75.14 
143.00 
 
74.07 
127.41 
 
70.35 
149.15 
 
89.55 
162.21 
% recipients from targets  
▪ Bulog data 
▪ BPS data 
 
146.63 
213.92 
 
137.91 
262.45 
 
135.77 
233.55 
 
133.85 
283.77 
 
128.19 
232.20 
Source: Bulog and Susenas BPS (processed) 
 
If Raskin rice had only been distributed to the poorest households recorded in Bulog data, the 
program would have been able to reach 70% to 95% of existing poor households, while 
according to BPS data it would have even exceeded the number of poor households (127% to 
152%). Furthermore, with a total number of 50–59 million households between 2002 and 
2006, the Raskin program should have been able to provide benefits for approximately 40% of 
households in Indonesia, and could have reached all households at the lowest level of 
prosperity, although the amount of rice would have been below the stipulated level. 
 
According to the Susenas results, however, Raskin rice was received by all household groups 
where grouping is based on quintiles of per capita expenditure. Households in quintiles 1 and 
2, which are the least prosperous groups, constituted only 53% of total recipients. A similar 
pattern was found in the three sample regions, where Raskin recipients belonging to quintiles 1 
and 2 constituted only 44% to 63%. By contrast, Raskin rice was received by households 
classed as nonpoor in quintiles 3 to 5, despite the fact that these households should not have 
obtained Raskin rice at all. This means that leakage of 47% occurred at the national level and 
between 37% and 56% in the sample regions (Table 7). 
                                                
8See, among others, Anak Bangsa Peduli (2006: 47), Hastuti and Maxwell (2003: 45), Komisi IV DPR RI (2007: 
10), Institute of  Demography (FEUI 2003: 17), LP3ES (2000: 54), Perdana and Maxwell (2004), Andalas 
University (2006: 3–25), Brawijaya University (2006: 113, 133), Hasanuddin University (2006: 52), World Bank 
(2003: 61), and World Bank (2005: 3). 
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Table 7. Distribution of Raskin Recipients by Quintile of per Capita 
Household Expenditure (%) 
Quintile 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Indonesia  
Quintile 1 
Quintile 2 
Quintile 3 
Quintile 4 
Quintile 5 
Total 
 
29.11 
23.66 
19.63 
16.37 
11.22 
100.00 
 
28.19 
23.38 
19.88 
16.74 
11.81 
100.00 
 
28.47 
23.37 
20.03 
16.60 
11.53 
100.00 
 
29.19 
24.01 
19.84 
16.06 
10.90 
100.00 
 
29.04 
23.48 
19.83 
16.36 
11.29 
100.00 
West Sumatra  
Quintile 1 
Quintile 2 
Quintile 3 
Quintile 4 
Quintile 5 
Total 
 
20.82 
23.47 
22.30 
17.86 
15.55 
100.00 
 
22.49 
21.90 
20.82 
21.37 
13.43 
100.00 
 
27.21 
20.98 
22.13 
17.28 
12.40 
100.00 
 
26.26 
21.38 
21.99 
16.63 
13.75 
100.00 
 
27.95 
22.50 
19.07 
17.91 
12.58 
100.00 
East Java  
Quintile 1 
Quintile 2 
Quintile 3 
Quintile 4 
Quintile 5 
Total 
 
31.26 
23.94 
19.18 
15.58 
10.04 
100.00 
 
31.86 
24.53 
19.43 
14.33 
  9.85 
100.00 
 
31.79 
24.94 
19.21 
14.79 
  9.28 
100.00 
 
33.64 
25.24 
19.18 
13.72 
  8.21 
100.00 
 
33.19 
24.74 
19.36 
14.08 
  8.64 
100.00 
Southeast Sulawesi  
Quintile 1 
Quintile 2 
Quintile 3 
Quintile 4 
Quintile 5 
Total 
 
34.25 
22.79 
19.57 
13.94 
  9.45 
100.00 
 
35.39 
27.43 
20.46 
12.05 
  4.68 
100.00 
 
33.14 
25.80 
19.98 
13.09 
  7.98 
100.00 
 
39.67 
23.24 
17.17 
12.56 
  7.37 
100.00 
 
36.59 
24.20 
18.55 
13.96 
  6.70 
100.00 
             Source: Susenas BPS 2002–2006 (processed) 
 
The extent of targeting accuracy can also be judged by comparing the proportions of poor and 
nonpoor households that the program does or does not reach. Analysis of Susenas data shows 
that in the 2005–2006 period, the proportion of poor households reached by the Raskin 
program rose by 19.8 percentage points from 62.9% to 82.7%. Unfortunately, this increase in 
poor beneficiaries was accompanied by an increase of 8 percentage points in the nonpoor 
households that benefited, namely, from 23.8% to 31.8% (Table 8).  
Table 8. Percentage of Raskin Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries 
by Household Poverty Status (%) 
2005 2006  
Poor Not poor Poor Not poor 
Recipients 62.88 23.85 82.69 31.82 
Nonrecipients 37.12 76.15 17.31 68.18 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Susenas BPS 2005 and 2006 (processed)  
Note: In 2006 the poor were defined as recipients of the Direct Cash Transfer and the nonpoor as those who did not 
receive this Transfer.  
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Between 2005 and 2006, the correlation between Raskin recipients and poor households in 
Indonesia increased from 40% to 48% but the value remained low. The correlation between 
Raskin recipients and poor households in the three sample regions also increased. The 
correlation in Southeast Sulawesi increased quite a lot from 43% to 65%, whereas in West 
Sumatra and East Java the rises were relatively smaller, moving from 36% to 50% and from 
41% to 47% respectively (Table 9).  
Table 9. Correlation between Raskin Beneficiaries 
and Households with Poor Status 
Correlation Coefficient Region 
2005 2006 
Indonesia 0.3987 0.4836 
West Sumatra 0.3658 0.4995 
East Java 0.4154 0.4757 
Southeast Sulawesi  0.4316 0.6574 
     Source: Susenas BPS 2005 and 2006 (processed) 
The results of the field studies show interregional variations in the determination of 
targets. Targeting is relatively accurate in the sample villages in West Sumatra, but even so 
a small number of poor households still do not receive Raskin rice while some nonpoor 
households do. Targets in the sample villages in East Java are not accurate because a 
system of equal distribution is applied, which means that households in all “poverty” 
categories receive rice. In the sample villages in Southeast Sulawesi the accuracy of targets 
varies. One sample village applies a rotational system and an equal share system, as a 
consequence of which both poor and nonpoor households are recipients. Targeting in the 
other sample villages is relatively accurate because Raskin rice is only distributed to 
households entitled to receive it. 
 
The document review reveals the existence of villages that have implemented the Raskin 
program relatively accurately as far as targeting is concerned, although only in a limited number 
of areas. Hastuti and Maxwell showed that targeting accuracy is influenced by the 
determination and commitment of the village head to distribute Raskin rice only to poor 
households (2003: 47). The local community accepted this policy because the village head 
socialized the fact that Raskin rice is intended only for poor households and because 
transparency existed on the part of recipient households. It proved possible to carry out this 
practice despite the fact that there was a tendency in neighboring villages for Raskin rice to be 
shared out equally among all households. 
 
Field findings in West Sumatra also show that targeting accuracy is influenced by 
commitment on the part of program administrators. In this region, governments from 
the provincial down to the village/kelurahan level support the Raskin program as part of 
the attempt to activate the poverty eradication program. Local governments include the 
successful handling of the Raskin program as an indicator in the performance evaluation 
of lower-level governments. Local governments stress to program administrators the 
need to use BPS data for poor households when identifying Raskin beneficiaries.9 Lists of 
beneficiaries are provided down to officials handling distribution of the rice to individual 
households. The community knows about the data and has easy access to these lists. 
Targeting accuracy is also encouraged by the efforts of various parties to increase  
                                                
9In Kabupaten Agam, verification of the BPS data for poor households, which had been used to determine 
targets, was done again at the end of 2006 by the local government in cooperation with BPS using APBD funds.   
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community understanding that Raskin rice is the right of poor households.10 In addition, an 
award was recently (2007) given to the district/city government that best managed Raskin 
rice distribution, with the expectation that an award of this kind will encourage all of 
districts/cities to try to obtain similar recognition in coming years. 
 
In Southeast Sulawesi, targeting in one study village was accurate because the supplied amount 
of rice was in accordance with the existing number of poor households. In addition, efforts are 
often made to include socialization of the Raskin program for the community at village 
meetings. 
 
2.1.4 Frequency of Distribution and Receipt of Rice  
 
Since July 1998, rice allocated through the Raskin program has been distributed every month 
or 12 times a year, except in 2006, when it was distributed only 10 times (Table 10).11 
Distribution frequency for 2007 was set at 12 times, yet there is a possibility that in reality the 
frequency will be lower because of the increase in the price of rice. When the National Budget 
was approved the price of rice supplied by Bulog was set at Rp3,550 per kg, but in reality there 
has been a price increase since June. At the time of the research the price had reached Rp4,000 
per kg. Consequently, there is a possibility that Raskin rice will not be distributed for the 
month of December unless the government increases the budget.  
Table 10. Raskin Distribution Frequency by Year 
Year Frequency per Year  
1998/1999 9 
1999/2000 12 
2000 9 
2001 12 
2002 12 
2003 12 
2004 12 
2005 12 
2006 10 
2007 12 
Source: Raskin General Guidelines, various years 
Several documents state that distribution frequency is in line with stipulations in the majority 
of regions. Nevertheless, there are some regions where frequency has been lower for various 
reasons. Hastuti and Maxwell (2003: 29), the Institute of Empowerment and Development 
Studies (2005: 56) and the University of Indonesia (2004: 161) have all reported the existence of 
                                                
10Socialization efforts were also undertaken by Andalas University, which designed stickers and offered them to 
the local government to be placed on each target house. The wording on the stickers was “Poor Household: Oh God, 
grant prosperity to our poor brothers, protect and bless them. If they are only pretending to be poor, we are aware that Your wrath is 
very bitter.” The local Bulog division also prepared CDs containing the Raskin song, which stresses that Raskin rice 
is intended only for poor households. 
11In 2000 there was a change in the budget year from April–March to January–December, which meant that in 
that year rice was distributed only nine times.   
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regions that have requested that Raskin rice be distributed once every two months because of 
allocation shortages. According to Tabor and Sawit, in West Nusa Tenggara Raskin is only 
distributed in the preharvest period because during the harvest season there are plenty of 
employment opportunities and foods is available (2006: 35). In that case, the region had 
actually received the correct amount of Raskin rice according to the quota for one year, but it 
was not distributed every month. Brawijaya University states that some villages have not 
received Raskin rice every month because of administration and payment problems (2006: 94). 
 
Field visits have indicated that Raskin rice is distributed regularly and in accordance with 
stipulations in the three sample regions. Kolaka District is an exception; in this district the 
amount of rice that is received is smaller than needed for the total number of poor households 
and so a decision has been made to distribute the allocation only nine times a year. One district 
in West Sumatra Province does not carry out monthly distribution, namely, the District of the 
Mentawai Islands. There rice is distributed once every four months because the area is located 
far from the provincial capital and can only be reached by sea transportation, which is greatly 
affected by weather conditions. 
 
Distribution frequency at the regional level is not always the same as the frequency with which 
target households receive the rice. Target households may not always access Raskin rice at each 
distribution because a rotation system may be in place. In other cases households cannot 
obtain the rice because they do not have the money to pay for it or because they have not been 
informed that the rice has arrived.12  
 
Documents reveal that while beneficiaries do not always obtain Raskin rice every month, there are 
even some cases where they have received it only once in a year. IPB states that frequency of rice 
receipt in its study areas varied from 1 to 10 times a year rather than 12 times IPB (2005: slide 12–
13). Anak Bangsa Peduli also stated that quite a lot of respondents (20% to 23%) only purchased 
Raskin rice 1 to 3 times in 2005 (2006: 37, 45). The Institute of Demography (FEUI 2003: 39) and 
Andalas University (2006: 3–22) also found that beneficiaries in several villages could not buy 
Raskin rice every month or else they bought it only once in 2 or 3 months because recipients took 
turn to do so. At the same time, when distribution frequency was fixed at 10 times a year in 2006, 
Fillaili et al reported that respondents received the rice once 1 to 6 times in that year (2007: 94).   
 
Analysis of Susenas data supports the document review findings. The frequency at which 
households at the national level and also in the three sample provinces received rice ranged from 
1 to 8 times. This means that no households in the Susenas sample received Raskin the full 12 
times during 2002. On average, households received the rice only 4 or 5 times a year, or less than 
50% of the stipulated frequency (Table 11). 
Table 11: Average Frequency of Receipt of Raskin 
per Beneficiary Household in 2002 
Region Average Minimum Maximum 
Indonesia 5 1 8 
West Sumatra  4 1 8 
East Java  5 1 8 
Southeast Sulawesi  4 1 8 
Source: Susenas BPS 2003 (processed) 
                                                
12This is found in the following studies: Anak Bangsa Peduli (2006: 47), Bulog (2006: 18), Institute of 
Demography (FE-UI 2003: 79-81), Andalas University (2006: 3-22), and the University of Indonesia (2004: 78). 
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In the study regions, the majority of beneficiaries were able to obtain rice at each Raskin rice 
distribution. In the study areas in West Sumatra, most recipients obtained the rice once every 
month. However, beneficiaries who did not obtain rice at each distribution were found in one 
hamlet where a rotation system was applied for certain households that were not regarded to 
be among the poorest households, which meant that they received Raskin rice every second 
month. Beneficiaries in the sample villages in East Java on the whole obtained Raskin rice 
every month. In the sample villages in Southeast Sulawesi, some recipients were able to obtain 
the rice in accordance with the distribution timetable, that is, 9 times per year, but in areas that 
applied an equal allocation system or a rotation system, beneficiaries received rice only 3 to 4 
times a year. 
2.1.5 Amount and Quality of Rice Received by Beneficiaries 
Each year, the distribution of the Raskin rice allocation at the national level is almost fully 
realized, at the rates of 95.13–99.97% (Table 12). Bulog distributes the rice allocation to the 
distribution points all over Indonesia, which numbered more than 50,000 in 2007. However, 
this alone does not adequately reflect the program’s distribution success; rather, the accuracy of 
both the quantity and quality of the rice received by beneficiary households must also be taken 
into account.  
Table 12. Raskin National Allocations and Their Allocation Realizations 
Realization Year Allocation Tonnes % 
2002 2,349,600 2,235,141 95.13 
2003 2,059,276 2,023,664 98.27 
2004 2,061,793 2,060,198 99.92 
2005 1,991,897 1,991,897 99.96 
2006 1,624,500 1,624,500 99.97 
Source: Bulog 
 
Quantity of rice received by beneficiaries 
 
The quota of Raskin rice per targeted household per month has experienced several changes. 
After being set at 20 kg for several years, the Raskin monthly quota per household fell to 15 kg 
in 2006 and to 10 kg in 2007 (Table 13). The rice quotas per household in 2001, 2005, and 
2006 are different with the General Guidelines. That is, for those years, the General Guidelines 
did not firmly set the amount of rice for each targeted household but put it within a certain 
range. In 2005, for instance, the General Guidelines allowed the distribution of between 10 and 
20 kg per beneficiary household, whereas the allocation was set at 20 kg. While on one hand 
this gave program administrators room to reach poor households that do not receive a quota, 
but on the other hand, it opens up opportunities for deviation.  
 
The document review reveals that the quantity of rice that beneficiary households receive 
varies and is generally less than the allocation to which they are entitled.13 In fact, when the 
                                                
13See Anak Bangsa Peduli (2006: 44), Bulog (2006: 37), Hastuti and Maxwell (2003: 37), Institute of 
Empowerment and Development Studies (2005: 58), IPB (2005: slide 12), IPB (2006: slide 11), FEUI 
Demography Institute (2003: 79), LP3ES (2000: 29), PT Daya Makara UI (2006: 95), Fillaili et al (2007: 72-73), 
West Java Raskin Monitoring and Evaluation Team (2005: slide 26), Andalas University (1999: IV-30), Andalas 
University (2005: 3-13), Andalas University (2006: 3-22), Bojonegoro University (2006: 53), Brawijaya University 
(2006: 133), University of Indonesia (2004: 142), and USESE Foundation (2004: 83). 
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rice quota was set at 20 kg, some beneficiaries only received 2 liters.14 The World Bank 
(2005: 3) has suggested that on average, beneficiaries only received 6–10 kg per distribution 
and University of Indonesia (2004: 142) stated that the figure is 8–16 kg per distribution. 
Andalas University (2006: 3-22) also reported that some beneficiaries only received 3 kg. 
Bogor Agriculture Institute (IPB) found that beneficiaries in Kabupaten Bogor received an 
average of only 2–4 kg per month and those in Kabupaten Sukabumi received an average 
of 6–8 kg per month (2005: slide 12–13). 
Table 13. Raskin Quotas and Realizations per Households per Month 
Quota 
(kilogram) 
Average Realization 
(kilogram) Year Allocation/RTM General Guidelines Bulog Susenas BPS 
1998/1999 10 and 20* 10 and 20* n.a. n.a. 
1999/2000 20 20 n.a. n.a. 
2000 20 20 n.a. n.a. 
2001 14.38 10–20  n.a. n.a. 
2002 20 20 13.0 8.9 
2003 20 20 14.3 7.5 
2004 20 20 14.7 8.6 
2005 20 10–20 14.9 7.0 
2006 15 10–15 9.8 5.7 
2007 10 10  n.a. n.a. 
Sources: Raskin General Guidelines, Bulog Data, and Susenas BPS for the various years (processed)  
Note: *The monthly Raskin rice quota per beneficiary household was 10 kg during July–November 1998 and 20 kg  
   during December 1998–March 1999; n.a. = data not available 
The result of the analysis of Susenas data shows that Raskin rice is distributed to more than 2 
to 3 times the targeted number of beneficiary households and that consequently each 
beneficiary received less rice than they should have (Table 14). According to Bulog data, 
beneficiaries received 9.8–14.9 kg per month, while according to BPS Susenas data they 
received 5.7–8.9 kg per month. These amounts only reach 65%–78% and 35%–45% of the 
total allocation quota per beneficiary respectively.  
Table 14. Realization of Amount of Raskin Received per Household  
Realization of Beneficiaries 
(households) 
Quantity of Rice per 
Household 
(kilograms) Year 
Distribution 
Realization 
(tonnes) Bulog BPS Bulog BPS 
2002 2,235,141 14,355,227 20,943,085 13.0 8.9 
2003 2,023,664 11,832,897 22,519,131 14.3 7.5 
2004 2,060,198 11,664,050 20,063,738 14.7 8.6 
2005 1,991,897 11,109,274 23,552,956 14.9 7.0 
2006 1,624,500 13,882,731 25,147,329 9.8 5.4 
  Source: Bulog and Susenas BPS 2002–2006 
 
 
                                                
14See Institute of Empowerment and Development Studies (2005: 58), IPB (2005: slide 12), IPB (2006: slide 11), 
and FEUI Demography Institute (2003: 79). 
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Similar findings were also obtained during the field visits, which showed that since the rice 
allocation has been determined at 10 kg, beneficiaries have not always received the correct 
amount, with differences found between regions. In the sample villages in West Sumatra, 
beneficiaries usually receive the stipulated quantity of 10 kg per month. Beneficiaries who 
received less Raskin rice than is stipulated, at only 10 liters, were only found in one 
neighborhood. This was caused by the fact that distributors had added unregistered poor 
households as beneficiaries, with the approval of the village and neighborhood heads and with 
the knowledge of registered beneficiaries.  
 
In one sample village in East Java, beneficiaries received 4–7 kg per month because Raskin rice 
was distributed evenly among all households. While they received less rice than they should 
have, the community did not fault this as they emphasized the importance of togetherness.   
 
In the case of Kabupaten Kolaka, Southeast Sulawesi, variations in the quantity of rice received 
did not only occur between villages or kelurahan, but also between hamlets. In one hamlet 
which alternated distribution, beneficiaries received the correct amount of 10 kg, but did not 
receive the rice during every distribution. In another hamlet of the same village which evenly 
distributed the rice, beneficiaries only received 4 kg each distribution. In a different sample 
village the number of beneficiaries was the same as the target, and so each beneficiary 
household received the correct amount of 10 kg in each distribution.  
 
Rice Quality  
 
According to the General Guidelines, Raskin rice is to be of medium quality and in good 
condition without any blighting or pests, in accordance with the government purchase quality 
standards as regulated in legislation. The document review shows that beneficiaries received 
rice of varying quality, with the majority of a satisfactory condition but occasionally spoiled.15 
According to FEUI Demography Institute, only a few sacks contained rice of an unsatisfactory 
quality (2003: 24).  
 
During the initial stages of the OPK program the quality of the rice was often criticized. 
However, over the following years the quality of Raskin rice tended to improve. According to 
Hastuti and Maxwell, the quality of Raskin rice in the sample regions was of an acceptable 
standard (2003: 25). IPB (2005: slide 25), the West Java Raskin Program Monitoring and 
Evaluation Team (2005: slide 10, 16, 27), and Andalas University (2006: 3-24) reported that the 
majority of respondents stated that the rice they received was suitable for consumption. 
University of Indonesia (2004: 145) also reported that the quality of Raskin rice was not 
particularly different to quality of the rice that beneficiaries usually consume.   
 
The field study results support the results from the document review. Respondents in the three 
sample regions stated that the Raskin rice they had received to date was of a good quality or 
equal to the quality of the rice they usually consume. However, in past years they had sometimes 
received poor quality rice that smelled bad, was infected with pests, or was yellow in color.  
 
 
 
                                                
15See Anak Bangsa Peduli (2006: 37, 44), IPB (2005 slide 25), Institute of Empowerment and Development Studies 
(2006: 86), Komisi IV DPR RI (2007: 11), LP3ES (2000: 30), PT Daya Makara UI (2006: 98), SMERU (1998: 9), 
Fillaili et al (2007: 98), Universitas Bojonegoro (2006: 55), Universitas Brawijaya (2006: 105-109), and USESE 
Foundation (2004: 73) 
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2.1.6 Price Paid by Beneficiaries and Payment Systems  
 
Since the program was initially implemented in 1998, the price of Raskin rice has been set at 
Rp1,000 per kilogram at the distribution point. The results of the document review show that 
in reality, beneficiaries pay prices varying between Rp1,000–2,900 per kilogram. The majority 
of the documents state that there are beneficiaries who pay the correct amount of Rp1,000 per 
kilogram, but all of the documents also state that some beneficiaries have paid above that 
amount. In fact, according to IPB (2006: slide 12), in some of their sample regions the price 
reached Rp3,750 per kilogram (Table 15).  
 
Table 15. Amount Paid by Beneficiaries (per kilogram)  
according to the Document Review  
Study Implementer Year of Publication 
Price 
(Rupiah/kilogram) 
Anak Bangsa Peduli 2006 1,000–1,500 
Bulog 2006 1,000–2,000 
Hastuti & Maxwell (SMERU) 2003 1,100–1,875 
Bogor Agriculture Institute 2005 1,400–1,800 
Bogor Agriculture Institute 2006 1,037–3,750 
Institute of Empowerment and 
Development Studies 2006 1,000–1,440 
LP3ES 1999 1,000–1,500 
FEUI Demography Institute 2003 1,000–2,200 
SMERU 2003 1,100–1,875 
Fillaili et al (SMERU) 2007 1,100–1,750 
West Java Raskin Team  2005 1,125–1,500 
Andalas University 1999 1,000–1,300 
Andalas University 2005 1,000–1,500 
Andalas University 2006 1,000–1,600 
(one case of 2,700) 
Bojonegoro University 2006 1,000–1,400 
Brawijaya University 2006 1,000–1,250 
Hasanuddin University 2006 1,000–1,350 
University of Indonesia 2004 1,000–1,200 
USESE Foundation 2004 1,000–1,800 
World Bank 2006 maximum of 2,900 
     
Based on the Susenas 2004–2006 data, the national average for the price paid by beneficiaries 
has exceeded the stipulated rate and has increased from year to year. This is also reflected in 
the three sample provinces (Table 16). Out of the three sample regions, West Sumatra 
recorded the highest prices and East Java the lowest.  
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Table 16. Raskin Price at the Household Level (rupiah per kilogram)  
Average Price Region 2004* 2005* 2006** 
Indonesia  1,160 1,225 1,253 
West Sumatra 1,175 1,261 1,477 
East Java 1,090 1,117 1,081 
Southeast Sulawesi  1,126 1,233 1,319 
Source: Susenas BPS 2004–2006 (processed) 
Notes: *: figures from final quarter  
           **: figures from final half  
 
The field findings show that beneficiaries pay varying prices per kilogram among the three 
sample regions. In the sample villages in West Sumatra, beneficiaries paid between Rp1,200–
1,300, in East Java they paid Rp1,000, and in Southeast Sulawesi they pay between Rp1,000 and 
Rp1,440. In East Java, the price is in accordance with the stipulated price as distribution points 
are located in each village and hence also function as direct distribution points.16 The price is 
higher in West Sumatra as the primary distribution points are only located in subdistrict offices, 
which are located up to 25 kilometers from where the rice is distributed to beneficiaries from 
secondary distribution points. In Southeast Sulawesi, depending on whether the rice is 
distributed to beneficiaries from direct or secondary distribution points, prices are either accurate 
or inaccurate.  
 
It can be concluded from the above facts  that the factors contributing to the accuracy of the 
price of Raskin rice include the distance of the distribution point from beneficiaries and the 
function of the distribution point, that is, whether it is only a primary distribution point or 
whether it also functions as a secondary point from where the rice is distributed to 
beneficiaries. Several studies have found that the price of Raskin rice is determined by 
transportation costs.17 Differences in the price of Raskin rice can be influenced by the 
provision of packaging (plastic bags, sacks, buckets) from beneficiaries (Institute of 
Empowerment and Development Studies 2005: 34; Institute of Demography (FEUI 2003: 22) and 
the size of the contribution from the regional budget (APBD) (Andalas University 2006: 3–23). 
 
Price variations have also been influenced by the policies that determine the price, the majority 
of which have been decided by local implementers. Hastuti and Maxwell reported a tendency 
for village heads to have the greatest role in the determination of the Raskin rice price (2003: 
35). According to USESE Foundation (2006: 56, 64, 69) and FEUI Demography Institute 
(2003: 19, 88–89), price determination methods vary, sometimes including community meetings, or 
otherwise prices are decided by RT/RW heads, PKK members, or the village head. However, 
according to the Institute of Empowerment and Development Studies (2005: 67), PT Daya 
Makara UI (2006: 93), and Hasanuddin University (2006: 39), the village head and beneficiaries 
determine the price together.  
 
                                                
16Direct distribution points both receive the rice from Bulog and distribute it directly to the beneficiaries. In areas 
where this does not occur, in this study, the points to where Bulog delivers the rice are referred to as primary 
distribution points (titik distribusi), and the points from where beneficiaries collect their rice are called secondary 
distribution points (titik bagi).  
17See Hastuti and Maxwell (2003: 35), Institute of Empowerment and Development Studies (2005: 67), Institute of  
Demography (FEUI 2003: 19), PT Daya Makara UI (2006: 93), and Bojonegoro University (2006: 51). 
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The field findings show that various methods are used to decide upon the price. In the sample 
villages in West Sumatra and Southeast Sulawesi, the village head or distributor determines the 
price, while in East Java a village meeting is held for that purpose. While beneficiaries are not 
involved in the price determination process in all locations, they generally accept the suggested 
price as it is always less than the market price. 
 
Beneficiary households generally pay for their Raskin rice with cash (cash and carry). In several 
cases households pay before the rice arrives, but in other cases they can pay after they have 
collected the rice. The requirement to pay for the rice with cash can mean that beneficiaries are 
not able to purchase it when the rice arrives. According to FEUI Demography Institute, if a 
poor household were unable to redeem rice, then their quota would be offered to other 
households who are not necessarily poor (2003: 18).  
 
Distributors transfer the money collected from beneficiaries to program administrators at the 
distribution points. The administrators will then transfer the money to the Bulog subregional 
division directly or via bank transfer. Usually, the implementers at the distribution points are 
given leeway of up to two weeks after the rice distribution to transfer the funds. The 
disbursement of funds from the distribution points determines the timing of the following 
disbursement of rice, as Bulog will not distribute the rice if the funds have not been received.19  
 
2.1.7 Capacity Building 
 
The Raskin program does not have a special agenda to increase the capacity of implementing 
institutions or the community. It is only designed to provide subsidized rice for poor families 
in order to reduce their food expenditure. Nevertheless, in 2005–2006, Bulog invited 10 
tertiary institutions to conduct a study and assist in 12 provinces. To carry out their 
assignment, the universities placed students in several villages/kelurahan to assist the Raskin 
administrators with aspects of socialization, target determination, distribution, and payments, 
and also provided feedback to Bulog.  
 
The assistance from the tertiary institutions to village/kelurahan -level administrators is not 
effective as it is a research-focused project and the areas of assistance are limited. For instance, 
Andalas University only provided assistance in 6 villages/kelurahan in 2005 and 12 
villages/kelurahan in 2006, out of a total of 900 villages/kelurahan in West Sumatra. In addition, 
the assistance was only provided for 2 months each year.  
 
The field study found similar results. SMERU did not come across any assistance or capacity 
building efforts for implementing institutions or beneficiaries in the three sample regions. In 
fact, in one sample village in East Java that should have received assistance from a tertiary 
institution, there was no sign of information that confirmed the village had actually received 
any assistance. 
 
Nevertheless, although not specifically provided, capacity building can also result from the 
experience of implementing the program. Program implementers can obtain additional 
knowledge and skills, such as planning, target determination, distribution methods, 
management, complaint handling, and reporting. For other groups, such as tertiary institutions, 
NGO, and research institutes, Raskin implementation can be used as a source of knowledge 
through the implementation of research or monitoring and evaluation activities. Tabor and 
                                                
19See Anak Bangsa Peduli (2006: 47), FEUI Demography Institute (2003: 18), Fillaili et al (2007: 77), Hasanuddin 
University(2006: 36), and USESE Foundation (2004: 74). 
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Sawit have stated that Raskin functions as a laboratory that is beneficial for building the 
capacity of civil society at various levels via monitoring activities and program accountability 
(2006: 61).  
 
 
2.2 Funding Structure 
 
In accordance with the national scale of program operations, the central government is 
primarily responsible for the Raskin program’s funding. There have been several changes to 
funding sources since the program’s initial implementation. According to Tabor and Sawit, 
during its first eight months the program was entirely funded by APBN routine funds (rupiah 
murni) (2006: 98). After that and until 2001, the program was included as one of the Social 
Safety Net (JPS) programs and was entirely funded by soft loans from the World Bank, IMF, 
World Food Programme (WFP), and grants and bilateral aid through the Social Safety Net 
Adjustment Loan (SSN-AL). In 2002 the program split from the JPS and since then it has 
again been funded by APBN routine funds. In addition to the APBN, Raskin’s implementation 
is subsidized by funds sourced from regional budgets and the community.  
 
2.2.1 Funding Amounts 
 
The government has increased its allocation of funds for the Raskin program from year to year 
in line with the increases in the number of targeted RTM. In the program’s first year (1998–
1999), Rp2.67 trillion of APBN funds was allocated (Tabor and Sawit 2006: 107). In 2007, 
Raskin funding had increased to Rp6.28 trillion (Table 17), equaling an average annual increase 
in the Raskin budget of 15%.  
 
Table 17. Raskin Budgets and Their Budget Realizations 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Raskin budget (trillion rupiah) 4.24 4.8 4.83 4.97 5.32 6.28 
APBN realization costs per kilogram (rupiah) 
  Procurement 1,781.55 1,582.09 1,410.14 2,240.98 3,143.53 3,671.88 
  Packaging 96.59 106.74 36.83 42.73 49.7 57.06 
  “Exploitation” 157.54 175.75 175.84 354.37 474.43 483.59 
  Management 87.54 84.52 90.35 190.96 248.65 246.17 
  Bank fees 21.53 25.32 21.41 48.98 79.1 110.62 
  Interest repayments 280.51 277.44 232.32 452.91 592.72 n.a. 
  Historic stock carryover  677.21 1,086.98 1,494.67 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Total cost 3,102.47 3,338.84 3,461.56 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
    Source:  Years 2002–2004 from Tabor and Sawit (2006: 41); Years 2005–2007 from Bulog 
    Notes:  Bulog did not provide data for historic stock carryover for 2005–2007; “exploitation” costs involve warehouse fees 
(rental, surveying, construction, and renovation), transporting the rice between regions, depreciation, fumigation, 
and spraying; historic stock carryover is the historic value or book value of rice bought in the previous year and 
sold to the government in the current year. 
 
The General Guidelines ask that regional governments allocate APBD funds in line with their 
responsibility to distribute rice to beneficiaries from the distribution points. Provincial 
governments are asked to provide a budget for program support, coordination, and monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E). District/city governments are asked to allocate a budget for operational 
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costs from the distribution points to the beneficiaries, as well as for the establishment of a 
Community Complaints Unit (UPM), coordination, and M&E.  
 
According to University of Indonesia, regional government commitment via the APBD is needed 
to provide advance funds (dana talangan)20 and the cost of distribution and socialization (2004: 153–
156). Only one of the five sample districts provided advance funds and not one provided 
operational costs. Anak Bangsa Peduli stated that they found one sample district that provided 
operational costs and another that provided improvement costs (2006: 33, 40). Conversely, Andalas 
University stated that all districts/cities in West Sumatra had provided co-funding but in varying 
amounts and that only one city provided advance funds (2006: 3-26 and 3-27). 
 
The field findings show that regional government funding support for the Raskin program 
varies. The regional governments of the sample regions in West Sumatra are reasonably 
responsive in providing Raskin funds, with all districts/cities contributing but in varying 
amounts. As an example, in 2007, Kabupaten Pasaman provided Rp1.3 billion while 
Kabupaten Agam provided Rp110 million. In East Java, according to the Community 
Empowerment Board (Bapemas) for August 2007, only five districts have allocated a budget 
for conducting Raskin activities: Kabupaten Probolinggo (Rp62.8 million), Lamongan (Rp250 
million), Lumajang (Rp112.7 million), Jember (Rp90 million), and Nganjuk (Rp156 million). 
However, not one district/city government in Southeast Sulawesi allocated APBD funds to 
support the Raskin program. 
 
The General Guidelines also encourage the community to contribute towards the cost of 
distributing the rice from the distribution points to beneficiaries. This is realized in the form of 
payments for the rice that are higher than the official price of Rp1,000 per kilogram at the 
distribution points. The results of the document review and field study show that these 
community contributions vary, as outlined in subchapter 2.1.6 on the price that beneficiaries 
pay for the rice.  
 
2.2.2 Use of Funds 
 
Technically APBN funds for the Raskin program are used to fund three main activities: 
procurement, storage, and distribution of the rice to the distribution points. Table 17 details 
the use of APBN funds for Raskin, the majority of which are used for rice procurement, 
during 2002–2007. According to Tabor and Sawit, during 2002–2004, the majority of the 
Raskin budget was used to fund rice procurement (41–57%) and historic stock carryover (22–
43%) (2006: 41). Other components include bank interest (6.7–9.0%) and “exploitation” cost 
(5.1–5.3%). Management costs, often used as a measuring rod for the efficient use of funds for 
a program, only accounted for 2.5–2.8% of the budget. 
 
For 2005–2007, Bulog’s data on the use of APBN funds indicates a similar pattern. 
Nevertheless, during the period 2002–2007, the different funding components show different 
tendencies. The procurement and packaging costs fluctuate, while operational costs, 
management fees, bank fees, and interest all experienced significant increases.  
 
In the provincial and district/city levels, the cost of distributing the rice to the distribution 
points still falls under the responsibility of the APBN. Nationally, in 2007 the average 
distribution cost reached Rp173 per kilogram. At the provincial level, distribution costs from 
                                                
20Dana talangan are funds provided by regional governments and paid to Bulog to advance Raskin rice payments 
from the community, hence ensuring the routine distribution of Raskin rice.  
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the APBN vary between Rp105 per kilogram for Java to Rp1,855 per kilogram for Papua. In 
West Sumatra, distribution costs are around Rp141 per kilogram, with the exception of the 
Mentawai Islands (Rp411 per kilogram), which are difficult to access. In East Java, distribution 
costs are maintained at Rp102 per kilogram, and Rp114 per kilogram for Bulog’s Bojonegoro 
subregional division, which includes three districts. 
 
In fact, distribution costs from the APBN are not only used for transportation fees, but also for 
supporting costs such as administration fees, reporting costs, socialization, official travel, and 
honorariums. For example, in the Bojonegoro subregional division in East Java, the total Raskin 
operation costs for July 2007 reached Rp280.8 million to distribute 2,456 tonnes of rice to 1,232 
distribution points. The majority of the funds are reserved for the cost of transporting rice from 
Bulog to the distribution point (43% or Rp49 per kilogram) and costs at the distribution point 
(25% or Rp28 per kilogram). There are also supporting costs, mostly consisting of the cost of 
honorariums and official travel (Table 18).  
 
The cost of honorariums includes honorariums for members of regional Raskin teams and 
other related parties. The policy regarding the provision of honorariums is not formally 
regulated by Bulog, rather it depends on the respective regional or subregional division and the 
consideration of conditions in each region. One subregional division gives program 
administrators honorariums of Rp25,000 per distribution, while another gives honorariums to 
the relevant official or agency.  
 
Table 18. Use of Raskin Operational Costs in the Bojonegoro Subregional Division 
for July 2007  
Cost (rupiah) 
Component Total Cost (rupiah) 
Cost per Unit 
(Rp per kg) 
Percentage of Total 
Costs 
A. Distribution costs 189,933,390 77 68% 
- Transporting costs 120,349,390 49 43% 
- Distribution point expenses  69,584,000 28 25% 
B. Supporting costs 90,832,990 37 32% 
- Administration costs 18,502,530 8 7% 
- Honorariums and official travel 45,052,800 18 16% 
- Meetings and coordination 27,277,660 11 10% 
Total operational costs 280,766,380 114 100% 
   Source: Bulog East Java Regional Division, 2007 
 
Regarding the use of APBD funds, several documents that report that regional governments 
provide APBD funds for administering Raskin do not provide details regarding the use of the 
funds. The documents only state that APBD funds are used for operational costs, 
improvement costs, and as advance funds. Nevertheless, Andalas University reported that 
APBD funds in Kabupaten Pasaman are used for the cost of distributing rice, so that 
beneficiaries only pay Rp1,000 per kilogram (2006: 3–23). 
 
The field study shows that APBD funds are generally used to fund the activities of the Raskin 
administration team. In West Sumatra, Rp18 per kilogram of APBD funds are used for 
incentives for subdistrict-level program administrators. In the sample subdistricts, there are six 
program administrators including the subdistrict head, so each of them receives Rp75,000 per 
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distribution. In East Java, the majority of APBD funds are used for the operational costs of 
Raskin coordination teams in each district, not for distributing the rice or to make up for 
shortfalls in the amount of rice received.  
 
The funds sourced from the community from payments for the rice that exceed the stipulated price 
are generally used for the cost of transporting the rice from primary distribution points to the 
secondary distribution points. Transportation costs also include loading and unloading and 
incentives for officials. According to Tabor and Sawit, from 2002 to 2004, the community 
contributed Rp190 per kilogram, Rp210 per kilogram, and Rp250 per kilogram, totaling Rp425 
billion in both 2002 and 2003 and Rp515 billion in 2004 (2006: 41).  
 
2.2.3 Effectiveness and Efficiency of Funds Usage  
 
The performance of a program is determined by the effectiveness and efficiency of its use of 
funds. Indicators for this include the appropriateness of the use of funds, the unit cost of 
activities, and the outcome of the activities.  
 
Based on the document review, there are two opinions concerning the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the use of Raskin funds. The first opinion states that the use of Raskin funds is 
ineffective and inefficient (World Bank 2003: 63; 2005: 3; 2006: 215). The arguments behind 
this view are:  
 
(i) the Raskin program’s targeting is flawed as it has resulted in the leakage of Raskin funds to 
households who are not entitled to receive the benefit. In 2003, poor households only 
benefited from 18% of the total budget of Rp4.83 trillion. The majority (52%) of the budget 
actually benefited nonpoor households. This is supported by the Susenas data covered in 
section 2.1.3, that targeting leakage has reached 47%;  
 
(ii) program operational costs including Bulog’s profit are considered to be too high, 
accounting for 30% of the total Raskin budget; 
 
(iii) the difference between Bulog’s procurement costs and the price they charge the government 
for rice is too high. In 2004, the government paid Rp3,343 per kilogram, whereas rice could 
be obtained from private enterprises for Rp2,800 per kilogram. Table 19 shows the 
differences between the cost of procurement and Bulog’s selling price. The difference 
between the two prices ranges between 12% and 20%, or an average of 16% per year. 
 
Table 19. Difference between Bulog’s Procurement Cost and Selling Price  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Procurement price (Rp/kg) 2,470 2,790 2,790 2,790 3,550 4,000 
Selling price (Rp/kg) 2,804 3,343 3,343 3,494 4,275 4,620 
Difference (Rp/kg) 334 553 553 704 725 620 
Difference (%) 12% 17% 17% 20% 17% 13% 
Source: Tabor and Sawit (2006: 38); Bulog (2007). 
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The second opinion, which states that the implementation of the Raskin program is effective and 
efficient, is only based on the proportion of program management costs to total program cost 
(Tabor and Sawit 2006: 39–42). From 2002–2004, Raskin management costs only accounted for 
2.66%, 2.38% and 2.43% of the total budget. These figures are quite low when compared to the 
standard management costs of international social assistance programs, where a management cost 
ratio of 10% is usually considered to be good according to international standards. The 
management costs of some social assistance programs in Europe even reach 12–15%.  
 
Although they stated that management costs are low, Tabor and Sawit (2006: 42) also stated 
the need to significantly reduce the cost of the Raskin program as it uses short-term 
commercial credit,18 it has higher distribution costs than needed, the quality of rice in the 
program is lower than it should be, it has a higher historic stock carryover than needed, and 
Bulog use temporary workers to manage the program.  
 
According to Tabor and Sawit, inaccurate targeting, which accounts for a significant portion of 
the program’s implementational costs, cannot yet be used to evaluate the efficiency of Raskin 
funds usage (2006: 35–37). They noted that there are still weaknesses in the data and differing 
perceptions regarding poverty and food security, and as a result it is difficult to conclude 
whether or not the Raskin program’s targeting is appropriate. 
 
The field study results indicate that the use of Raskin funds is ineffective and inefficient. This 
can be concluded from the inaccurate targeting and funds utilization (see section 2.1.3). The 
inappropriate use of funds is indicated by the use of APBN Raskin funds for honorariums for 
local officials and agencies. As an example, several Bulog subregional divisions provided funds 
of Rp25,000 per distribution point. In a more extreme case, another gave honorariums to 
officials and agencies administering the program from the district level to the village level, 
totaling Rp2,060,000 per month or Rp24,720,000 per year (Table 20). If this practice was 
carried out nationally it would absorb Raskin funds of around Rp40 billion per year.19  
 
Table 20. Operational Costs for Honorariums for Local Officials and Agencies  
Honorarium Recipient  Honorarium Amount (Rp/Distribution) 
Bupati (Regent) 800,000 
Regional government 300,000–400,000 
BPS 300,000 
Bawasda 400,000 
Subdistrict head 75,000 
Statistics Assistant 
(Mantis)/family planning 
field worker (PKLB) 
50,000 
Village head 35,000 
Sector police 25,000–50,000 
  Source: Results of informant interviews  
 
                                                
18Bulog funds procurement and operational costs of distributing the rice with commercial credit from banking 
institutions, which is then invoiced to the central government via the Department of Finance. 
19Estimation based on the number of kabupaten, kecamatan, and villages. 
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The inefficient use of funds in the Raskin program is not limited to the use of APBN funds, 
but also occurs with APBD funding. An example of this was found in Kabupaten Agam, 
where APBD funds were used to provide honorariums to subdistrict program administrators.   
 
Apart from being inefficient, the practice of giving honorariums also breaches the regulations 
for the use of the budget. As the role of each official involved in the implementation of the 
Raskin program is part of their respective job descriptions, they should not receive any 
additional honorarium or incentive.  
 
The field findings also show that funds sourced from beneficiary households are also used 
inefficiently. In a sample village in West Sumatra, for example, beneficiaries pay between 
Rp1,200 and Rp1,300 per kilogram, which means that Rp200–300 per kilogram is budgeted for 
the cost of transporting the rice from the primary distribution point to the secondary 
distribution point. However, as the real transportation cost is only Rp44–125 per kilogram, 
there are excess funds of Rp154–175 per kilogram. The community is not informed about the 
excess funds from beneficiaries in a transparent manner, and the money is considered to be the 
“rightful property” of the distributors. Some distributors use the funds for their personal use 
while others divide the funds between other parties such as the PKK, community health posts, 
and village heads. With only 34–66 beneficiary households for each secondary distribution 
point, distributors and others involved at the local level have obtained excess funds of around 
Rp53,000–118,000 in each distribution. This is not only a case of the inefficient use of funds, it 
is a moral issue. Irrespective of the amount of funds involved, poor households are 
“subsidizing” to distributors, who are generally not poor.  
 
The emergence of the inefficient and/or misuse of the Raskin budget, be it sourced from the 
APBN, APBD, or the community, are a result of various factors, including the fact that the 
Raskin program is not fully funded by the central government, that is, the cost of distributing 
Raskin rice from the distribution point to beneficiaries is not covered. The Raskin General 
Guidelines indeed spell out that regional governments are responsible for distributing Raskin 
from the distribution points to the beneficiaries. On one hand, the central government has not 
seriously issued an imperative policy that is able to force regional governments to provide 
funds to support the implementation of Raskin. On the other hand, most officials at both the 
provincial and district level treat the Raskin program as they do other central government 
projects. This means that their involvement in the Raskin program depends on the provision 
of operational funding. Considering that the Raskin program is a central program, there is a 
tendency among local government to expect that all costs incurred as a result of the program 
are the full responsibility of the central government. 
 
 
2.3 Monitoring, Evaluation, and Complaints Handling 
 
According to the 2007 General Guidelines, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is part of 
program control and aims to review and evaluate Raskin’s implementational effectiveness 
based on the 6T performance indicators. As one aspect of M&E, the community can convey 
complaints, criticisms, and suggestions for improvements regarding the program directly to the 
UPM or via electronic media.  
 
2.3.1 Monitoring and Evaluation Activities 
 
The Raskin program has both internal and external M&E. The central, provincial, and 
district/city Raskin teams conduct internal M&E, while institutions external to the Raskin team 
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conduct the external M&E at either the request of the Raskin team, at the own initiative of 
relevant institutions, or at the request of a third party.  
 
According to Bulog’s 2006 M&E report, internal M&E is conducted in a limited number of 
sample regions for only one district/city per province. In practice these M&E activities could 
be better characterized as the handling of general complaints from officials administering the 
program, largely circumventing the intended M&E function of detecting and evaluating the 
program’s effectiveness according to the 6T indicators. According to the Institute of 
Empowerment and Development Studies, in Banten province, internal M&E is conducted in 
stages according to the level of government (2005: 71–72). Anak Bangsa Peduli stated that 
regional governments periodically conduct monitoring (2006: 33, 41). Hastuti and Maxwell 
(2003: 40–41), Olken (2006: 855), and Fillaili et al (2007: 100) considered that internal M&E is 
inclined to focus on financial and administrative aspects. BPKP (2004: 21) and IPB (2006: slide 
22) stated that monitoring is not yet optimal. According to Brawijaya University, the ineffective 
monitoring is caused by a lack of concern from stakeholders in the various levels of 
administration as no one is specifically responsible and no special funds are allocated for 
program management (2006: 135). 
 
According to Tabor and Sawit, however, the Raskin program can have a role in building public 
capacity to monitor a government service program (2006: 61). It can be seen from the review 
of several documents that external M&E has indeed been carried out by various institutions, 
including tertiary institutions, NGO, research institutes, and international organizations. The 
majority of the activities have focused on the Raskin program’s implementational processes by 
analyzing secondary data and conducting field visits. External M&E looking at the program’s 
impact is extremely limited and has only been done on a macro scale or using national-level 
secondary data.  
 
Since the program has been running, the Central Raskin Team has several times assigned various 
institutions to conduct M&E, among them LP3ES, CEFFNAS, and UGM in 1998–1999, 35 
private and public tertiary institutions in 2003, and ten tertiary institutions in 2005 and 2006. 
 
The field findings show that M&E in the study regions has been conducted by the regional 
Raskin teams. In addition, the regional and subregional divisions of Bulog have their own 
M&E teams, but their activities are only focused on the aspects falling under the interests and 
responsibilities of Bulog, such as payments, distribution timetables, weights, and rice quality.   
 
Internal M&E has only been done to the level of subdistrict officials administering Raskin. In 
West Sumatra, M&E is done in stages according to the level of government by either Bulog or 
regional government groups. M&E sometimes also encompasses socialization activities. There 
are no routine M&E activities in East Java as no specific funds are allocated for that purpose. 
Internal M&E tends to be incidental, done whenever community complaints are received. In 
Southeast Sulawesi, internal M&E is conducted via a staged reporting mechanism beginning 
from the lowest level of government in the Southeast Sulawesi regional division and from 
direct observation in the field.  
 
External M&E also varies between the regions. In West Sumatra and East Java, both assisted 
areas, the university assistance groups conduct M&E, but it is limited. In East Java, external 
M&E tends to be conducted only at the specific request of Bulog. In Kabupaten Agam, M&E 
has only been done in 2007, and this was not intensive. Only one day was set aside to visit one 
district, one subdistrict, and one sample village. In Southeast Sulawesi, external M&E at the 
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community level was only found in one sample village, and only extended to one visit by an 
NGO in 2007. 
 
The results of M&E have provided information about the program’s implementation, both 
casuistic based on field findings and on a macro level based on the analysis of secondary data, as 
found in the document review and discussed in the main findings. Generally, M&E results provide 
input for the improvement of the program’s design, such as the need for increasing the accuracy of 
target determination through the change in the program’s name from OPK to Raskin, the change 
of the source of data from BKKBN to BPS, the implementation of village consultative meetings, 
and the need for program and targeting transparency. Nevertheless, such design improvements 
have not been fully adopted in the program’s implementation, resulting in the continuing shortfalls 
in the program’s implementation.  
 
2.3.2 Auditing System  
 
Audits of the Raskin program are regulated in Law No. 15/2004 on Audit of State Financial 
Management and Accountability and Minister of Finance Regulation on Bulog’s Budget which is 
reissued each year.20 For example, in Minister of Finance Regulation No. 117/PMK.02/2007 in 
Chapter 8, section 3, article 19 clause (1) states that “The cost of maintaining (perawatan) the rice as 
defined in article 8 clause (3) and the Raskin program food subsidy as defined in article 11 clause 
(6) is to be audited by an auditor that is authorized in accordance with the valid stipulation.”  
 
During the time that Raskin has been running, the auditing institution has changed based on 
the change in Bulog’s legal status from a nondepartmental government institution to a public 
company (perum). BPKP (the Financial and Development Supervisory Board) conducted the 
audits up to 2004, and in 2005 BPK (the State Audit Agency) took over the task. The two 
organizations have audited different aspects of the program: BPKP focused on aspects of the 
program’s implementation, whereas BPK concentrates on fiscal aspects.  
 
The BPKP’s report on their audit of the program’s 2003 implementation was published in 
2004, showing that the national performance of the Food Sector Fuel Subsidy Reduction 
Compensation Program (Raskin), or PKPS BBM Bidang Pangan (Raskin), reached 78.2% of the 
ideal of 100%. The overall performance achievement figure is based on the figures for accuracy 
of household targeting (59.4%), amount of rice (61.42%), and realization of the amount paid 
by beneficiaries (68.5%). In addition, the BPKP stated that the distribution transaction 
documents did not contain sufficient detail, that there were still a number of district/city 
governments that had not published technical guidelines, and that the actual monitoring of rice 
distribution was weak. They also stated that the results of the functional monitoring officials’ 
audit had not been followed up, and so deviations in rice distribution had continued in that 
year’s program implementation.  
 
The BPK audit of Bulog’s rice storage costs (biaya perawatan) for the 2004 financial year was 
published in 2006 and reported several basic accounting discrepancies. Before the audit, 
Bulog’s claim to the government for rice storage totaled Rp349,980,847,938.02, but after the 
audit it was revised to Rp248,792,012,813.14, a negative correction of Rp101,188,835,124.88, 
or 29%. The discrepancy was created as Bulog had included other costs in the storage costs 
claim, such as (i) the cost of asset construction and construction management costs that had 
been included in building maintenance costs; (ii) the cost of wages, and functional, official, and 
operational allowances, holiday allowances, and the one month's wage bonus in personnel 
                                                
20These include Minister of Finance Regulation No.115/PMK.02/2005, No.50/PMK.02/2006, and No.117/PMK.02/2007. 
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management costs; iii) the inclusion of electricity, water, and telephone expenses for officials' 
residences, contributions, and the maintenance of their commercial operations warehouses in 
procurement management expenses; and (iv) the cost of WFP rice, incentives, allowances for 
the operational team, representative allowances, and official travel for commercial operation, as 
well as celebratory costs and contributions external to public service obligation (PSO) 
activities, to operational management costs.  
 
The BKP 2004 audit of Perum Bulog and its adherence to legislative regulation and internal 
controls found several issues related to Raskin’s implementation, such as regional governments 
that are in arrears, the embezzlement of 598 tonnes of rice from the Kabanjahe warehouse 
worth Rp2.2 billion, and the misuse of the proceeds from Raskin sales of Rp148 million by 
officials in Bulog’s Semarang subregional division.  
 
According to the BPK, Bulog has followed up the majority of audit reports in accordance with 
the findings and recommendations. Follow-up measures have included the creation of 
guidelines dealing with the procurement of goods and services and informing regional 
governments with Raskin payments in arrears.  
 
2.3.3 Complaint Handling System  
 
Community feedback regarding the program’s implementation in the form of complaints, 
criticisms, or suggestions for improvement can be lodged with the UPM, which is coordinated 
by the village community empowerment board (BPMD). According to the General Guidelines, 
UPMs are established at the provincial and district/city level. The units receive written 
feedback, telephone feedback, or community members can visit the UPM secretariat. 
 
Several documents stated that each province and district/city has a community complaints 
unit. Nevertheless, communities are not informed about the existence of the service so they are 
barely functional. PT Daya Makara Universitas Indonesia stated that UPM are still functioning 
at a minimum as the community is not fully aware that they are in place (2006: 99–100). LP3ES 
stated that the majority of the community is not aware that they are permitted to lodge 
complaints (2000: 27). The field findings support the document review findings that each 
region already has a UPM. In addition, Bulog regional and subregional divisions also provide a 
complaint facility through a post office box and a free-call telephone service. However, again, 
as information regarding the services is not provided to the community, the services are hardly 
functioning.  
 
Due to the lack of socialization, the community is largely unaware of the existence of 
community complaints service, feedback mechanisms, and to where or with whom they should 
lodge their feedback. On the other hand, the community is generally also reluctant to complain 
even if there is a problem. According to PT Daya Makara Universitas Indonesia, communities 
are unconcerned about problems in the Raskin program in their region and some are apathetic 
to complaints as government programs have a bad stigma (2006: 99–100). The LP3ES report 
states that the majority of respondents (89%) have never lodged a complaint about program 
implementation problems (2000: 34). Brawijaya University stated that the community has 
generally never complained to anyone about the Raskin program (2006: 108–109). 
 
If a member of the community does have a complaint, they usually only lodge it with 
village/kelurahan officials, Raskin rice distributors, or the community leader in the region. Anak 
Bangsa Peduli stated that the majority of complaints are lodged with the neighborhood heads 
(ketua RT/RW) (2006: 38, 45). According to Institute of Empowerment and Development, 
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community complaints are redirected to the Raskin official at the RT level (2005: 76). LP3ES 
reported that complaints are lodged with village heads, distributors, or community leaders 
(2000: 35). The field study supports these findings: generally the community does not file 
complaints, but if they do they lodge them with the distributor or a village/kelurahan official.  
 
The complaints that do emerge from the community are generally related to the issues of 
quality or quantity of rice that the beneficiaries have received, targeting accuracy, and the 
accuracy of the weight of rice in each sack. Anak Bangsa Peduli reported that complaints from 
the community are generally regarding rice quality, the packaging, inadequate quotas, and 
uneven division of allocations (2006: 38, 45). Institute of Empowerment and Development  
stated that the complaints are generally regarding the quality of Raskin and totals of rice below 
20 kg per sack (2005: 75–76). LP3ES stated that the problem dominating complaints is related 
to the policy regarding rice amounts and targeting accuracy (2000: 35).  
 
Almost all complaints are never resolved. Brawijaya University stated that although a small 
proportion of community members have complained, none have received a response from a 
village/kelurahan official (2006: 109). LP3ES reported that very few respondents stated that 
their complaints had been resolved. This is because their complaints were policy-related, 
usually concerning the amount of rice or targeting accuracy, and as such did not fall under the 
authority of the village head or local program administrators (2000: 35).  
 
According to the field findings, the community is reluctant to complain as they are afraid of a 
negative impact on the continuation of their status as a Raskin beneficiary. If someone does 
wish to make a complaint, they would only lodge it with the distributor. A small number of 
complaints are resolved at the local level, but the majority of complaints which are not 
resolved are never passed up to a higher level. The complaints that are passed on to a higher 
level (to a Bulog official) usually only concern rice quality.  
 
 
2.4 Attainment of Results, Level of Satisfaction, and Benefit of the 
Program 
 
The government has spent quite a large amount of money every year on the Raskin program. 
Besides that, the program has also involved a number of government agencies from the central 
level down to the village/kelurahan level. Several institutions outside the program such as 
research institutes, universities, and NGO have conducted extensive research and evaluation in 
order to provide feedback for program improvement. With all the resources that have been 
involved and the efforts that have been made, it is hoped that this program can be 
implemented properly to the point where attainments are high, where the various parties are 
satisfied, and where it proves beneficial for beneficiaries.  
 
An explanation of the results that the Raskin program has achieved, stakeholder satisfaction with 
program implementation, and the extent to which the program has proved useful for recipient 
households is provided below. The explanation is based on the results of the document review, 
secondary data analyses, and field studies. In the field studies, satisfaction levels and program 
benefits for recipient households were evaluated during FGDs in the six sample villages. FGD 
participants were asked to rate their opinions on a scale of 0–10, with 0 indicating the lowest level 
of satisfaction or benefit and 10 indicating the highest level. FGD participants were divided into 
two groups by sex, which meant that 12 varying assessments were obtained. 
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2.4.1 Attainment of Results 
 
The objective of the Raskin program, according to the General Guidelines, is to reduce the 
burden of expenditure on poor households by helping them to fulfill part of their food needs 
by providing subsidized rice. If a poor household obtains the full quota of 10 kg a month, 
approximately 25% of their rice needs will be subsidized since on average a household 
consumes around 40 kg of rice per month. 
 
The document review, secondary data analyses and field studies show that so far the Raskin 
program has not achieved its goal, the main reason being targeting inaccuracy. The number of 
households to which Raskin rice is distributed is greater than the stipulated figure and it also 
reaches nonpoor households, meaning that the quota of rice obtained by poor households is 
far below the stipulated amount. The situation has been made worse by reductions in 
distribution frequencies, the fact that there are still poor households that are not Raskin 
beneficiaries, and the high prices at which households have to purchase the rice. For example, 
the World Bank has stated that on average the value of the Raskin rice subsidy received by 
beneficiaries is only around 2.1% of per capita expenditure and that most of the subsidy does 
not reach the right households (2005: 3). 
 
It can be concluded from the above description that the Raskin program has been unable to 
provide any significant assistance for poor members of the community by reducing their 
household expenditure. If the objective of reducing expenditure has not yet been attained, the 
Raskin program has likewise not yet made a contribution to poverty reduction. Andalas 
University stated that although 53.3% of government officials and 42.3% of community figures 
believe that Raskin has been successful by comparison with other programs, significant results 
are not yet apparent if the program is viewed from its effectiveness in reduction poverty (2006: 
3-27). According to the Institute of Empowerment and Development Studies, Raskin is a 
Bulog project or core business that prioritizes the distribution of rice, and hence it has not 
reached its target of poverty reduction (2005: 74).   
 
2.4.2 Level of Satisfaction with the Program 
 
Out of all the documents that were reviewed, not one makes mention of a local government 
that is satisfied with Raskin’s implementation. Instead, the documents mentioned local 
governments that are dissatisfied. According to PT Daya Makara UI, some local governments 
are apathetic towards Raskin because its achievements are still far from its objectives (2006: 
84). LP3ES also reported that there are village officials that were not satisfied with the impact 
of the program because of its effect on mutual cooperation and creativity among the 
communities (2000: 47). According to Hastuti and Maxwell, some village heads believed that 
the Raskin program is not that beneficial for the community (2003: 56).   
 
During the field studies, various respondents from the provincial level to the community level 
expressed the opinion that certain program implementation activities are still weak, particularly 
those related to socialization to the community, targeting, and the complaints mechanism. One 
aspect that was positively assessed by a number of parties is the quality of the rice provided.  
 
Seeing the reality of program implementation in the field, local government officials had different 
attitudes towards and perceptions of the Raskin program’s existence. On the one hand, there are 
officials who believe that the program is still needed to help with the provision of food for poor 
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families. On the other hand, there are those who consider that the program is no longer necessary 
because its effects are not commensurate with the money that has been expended on it.  
The opinion that the program should not be continued was also found in a number of 
documents. Hastuti and Maxwell encountered village heads who did not agree with the Raskin 
program and felt that it would be far better to discontinue it (2003: 56), while the Institute of 
Demography stated that some village heads do not agree with the program because it teaches 
the community to develop a “begging” mentality (FEUI 2003: 40). LP3ES reported their 
concern that the community will become dependent on rice assistance and that this will give 
rise to social jealousy (2000: 47).  
 
Conversely, beneficiaries are relatively satisfied with Raskin. Andalas University  reports that 95% 
of respondents are satisfied with the method of service (1999: IV–33, IV–34), while Bojonegoro 
University  reports that the quality of service in the disbursement of Raskin is in the “very good” 
category with a community satisfaction index of 82.25 (2006: 56). 
 
An analysis of FGDs involving members of beneficiary households shows that women participants 
on average gave a higher evaluation rating than did men. According to women participants, the 
price of the rice is the most satisfactory aspect of the Raskin program, while the least satisfactory 
aspect is the complaints mechanism. According to male participants, the most satisfactory aspect is 
the method of payment, while the least satisfactory is monitoring (Figure 2).  
 
Discussions in the combined male-female FGDs indicate that the most satisfactory aspects of 
Raskin implementation are the price level, payment methods, and the distribution system. 
Even though most beneficiaries pay more than Rp1,000 per kg for the rice, they have no 
objections and regard the price as appropriate because it is extremely low when compared to 
the prevailing market price of around Rp4,200 per kg, especially when they realize that the 
price they have to pay already includes the cost of transportation from the primary distribution 
point to the secondary distribution point. Payment methods are considered to be quite 
satisfactory because it does not constitute a burden on beneficiary households. In fact, 
beneficiaries could sometimes ask distributors that they be allowed to postpone their payment 
if they did not have adequate money ready at the time of distribution. Meanwhile, the 
distribution methods usually adopted by the village officials, hamlet, RW, or RT heads, or 
PKK office-bearers are also regarded as quite good because they divide the rice fairly and with 
a suitable measuring system (Figure 2). 
 
The aspects regarded as least satisfactory by the combined FGD participants are the 
monitoring and complaint systems and the quantity of rice. Participants were not satisfied with 
monitoring for the simple reason that there have never been any monitoring activities in their 
areas. They were also not particularly satisfied with the complaint aspect because they were not 
aware of the existence and mechanism of the complaint system. Dissatisfaction with the 
amount of rice that was given to beneficiaries stemmed from the fact that it was far less than 
household requirements. For example, if a family receives the full quota of 10 kg, it would only 
be sufficient for one week’s consumption. 
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Source: FGDs with Beneficiaries  
Note:  Level of satisfaction is measured on a 0–10 scale. The value 0 means least satisfactory while 10 indicates 
most satisfactory.  
Figure 2.  Beneficiary Level of Satisfaction with Raskin Implementation  
 
2.4.3 Program Benefit for Beneficiary Households 
 
General benefit 
 
A number of documents express the opinion that Raskin is useful for beneficiary households 
because it is able to help reduce their economic burden and help them meet their rice needs 
while also improving the quantity and quality of household consumption.21 For example, 
Hasanuddin University reported that poor members of the community as well as community 
figures and local governments believed that the Raskin program was very beneficial for poor 
households by reducing their economic burden (2006: 52). According to Tabor and Sawit, food 
assistance is able to solve some of the nutrition problems of poor families (2006: 12). 
 
Apart from its direct benefits, Raskin also yields indirect benefits such as the creation of 
employment and assistance with health and educational expenses, while also contributing to price 
stabilization. Anak Bangsa Peduli reported that some respondents believed that Raskin was 
beneficial because it created labor-intensive work for other people such as those employed in 
transportation and in loading and unloading of the rice (2006: 40). LP3ES reported that although 
the transfer of income from the Raskin program is small, it enables beneficiaries to save money for 
things such as health and educational expenses (2000: 55). Tabor and Sawit stated that Raskin can 
maintain stability in rice prices (2006: 45).  
 
Field studies revealed that stakeholders at provincial, district and subdistrict levels have diverse 
assessments of Raskin’s benefit for poor households. Some stakeholders say that it helps those 
members of the community who cannot afford to meet their food needs, while others believe 
                                                
21See Anak Bangsa Peduli (2006: 47), IPB (2006: slide 24), LP3ES (2000: 55), SMERU (1998: 4), Tabor and Sawit 
(2006: 12, 50), Tim Monitoring dan Evaluasi Raskin Provinsi Jawa Barat (2005: slide 17, 21, 28), Andalas 
University (2005: 3–15 and 2006: 3–23, 3–24), Brawijaya University (2006: 109), and Hasanuddin University 
(2006: 52) 
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that as a program Raskin is not educating because it spoils poor households. Recipient 
households, however, find the program beneficial, even though the amount of rice that they 
receive is not sufficient and the quality is sometimes poor. 
 
Information obtained through FGDs shows that all participants feel that Raskin is beneficial 
for poor households. The amount and the type of Raskin benefits mentioned by FGD 
participants differed a little from region to region. FGDs in Kabupaten Agam named eight 
benefits, whereas in Bojonegoro and Kolaka participants mentioned only four. Of all the 
various benefits described in FGDs, only three were consistently mentioned by participants in 
all locations: help with food expenses, a reduction in a family’s economic burden and worries, 
and assistance with educational expenses (Table 21). With Raskin, beneficiaries can reduce the 
money spent on foods, which means a reduction in the family’s economic burden and in its 
associated worries. Less expenditure on food creates additional income that is used, among 
other things, to pay for educational requirements, to help with social activities like arisan, and 
to make possible the acceptance of social invitations.22 In the specific case of FGDs in West 
Sumatra, recipients also mentioned other Raskin benefits, namely, the prevention of price 
fluctuations, the raising of enthusiasm because of government attention to the economically 
weak members of the communities, and assistance in eradicating poverty.  
Table 21.  Level of Benefit of the Raskin Program  
Values  
Raskin Benefits 
 
West 
Sumatra 
East 
Java 
Southeast 
Sulawesi Average 
1.  Helps with food costs  6.5 6 8.7 7.1 
2.  Reduces economic burden/thoughts  6 6.5 7.7 6.8 
3.  Helps with educational costs 6.4 5 7.5 6.5 
4.  Prevents price fluctuations  7 - - - 
5.  Encourages enthusiasm  6.2 - - - 
6.  Helps eradicate poverty  5.5 - - - 
7.  Enables vegetables and side 
          dishes to be added 5 - - - 
 8.  Makes possible arisan payments and  
           acceptance of invitations  
1.5 5 3.3 3.3 
Source: FGDs with beneficiaries 
 
Income transfers 
 
One of the benefits of Raskin is that it represents an income transfer in the form of rice from 
the Raskin program to recipient households. In very simple terms, beneficiaries obtain an 
income transfer or a financial subsidy of an amount that depends on the quantity and 
distribution frequency of rice, as well as the relative price differences between Raskin rice and 
rice in the local market.  
 
                                                
22In Indonesia it is generally the custom that if someone attends a celebration such as a wedding, circumcision, or 
adat ceremony they will make a cash contribution to the person holding the gathering.  
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Tabor and Sawit state that in 1998/1999, Raskin transferred Rp3.4 trillion to 9.3 million 
households or the equivalent of Rp365,590 per year or Rp30,466 per month per household 
(2006: 109). According to LP3ES, the income transfer to recipients in September 1999 was 
only Rp15,357 (2000: 55). Tabor and Sawit also reported that in 2002–2004, based on the 
assumption that there were 13.2 million recipient households and that the value of total 
transfer benefits was Rp3.25 trillion per year, recipient households obtained an income transfer 
that averaged Rp20,500 per month (2006: 45).  
 
Theoretically, the total Raskin income transfer per month to recipient households in 2007 was 
the equivalent of 10 kg multiplied by the difference between the price of rice in the local 
market and the price of Raskin rice (officially Rp1,000 per kg). At the time when field studies 
were carried out, medium-quality rice (equal in quality to Bulog rice) in the sample areas was 
around Rp4,200 per kg. This means that Raskin beneficiaries would have been given a subsidy 
equal to Rp32,000 per month or Rp384,000 per year.  
 
In reality, beneficiaries in the sample areas did not receive a subsidy of this size, both because the 
quantity of rice and the frequency of distribution were less than what had been stipulated and 
because the price that they paid was greater than Rp1,000 per kg. In the sample region of West 
Sumatra, beneficiaries obtained 8–10 kg per month or in a small number of cases every two 
months, but at a price of between Rp1,200 and Rp1,300 per kg. In East Java, the Raskin rice 
price was Rp1,000 per kg, but beneficiaries received only 4 to 7 kg per month. In Southeast 
Sulawesi beneficiaries received rice only 3 to 9 times during 2007. On each occasion they were 
given between 4 and 10 kg at a price of Rp1,000 to Rp1,200 per liter. In a situation of this kind, 
the income transfer to households that received Raskin rice in the sample areas ranged from 
Rp12,800 to Rp29,000 per distribution or from Rp38,400 to Rp348,000 per year (Table 22).  
Table 22. Raskin Income Transfers to Beneficiaries in Sample Regions (2007) 
West Sumatra East Java Southeast Sulawesi Item Stipulation 
Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Market price 4,200 4,200 4,200 4,200 4,200 4,200 4,200 
Raskin price 1,000 1,200 1,300 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,440 
Price difference 3,200 3,000 2,900 3,200 3,200 3,200 2,760 
Amount  (kg) 10 8 10 4 7 4 10 
Frequency  
       per year 12 6 12 12 12 3 9 
Subsidy per 
distribution 32,000 24,000 29,000 12,800 22,400 12,800 27,600 
Subsidy  
      per year 384,000 144,000 348,000 153,600 268,800 38,400 248,400 
 
Access to rice   
 
The benefit of Raskin rice for the community in terms of access to rice is relatively small because 
rice is always available at the community level. In all locations rice can be obtained both from 
local harvests in the area itself or from other places from where it is brought to the study areas by 
local traders. Moreover, rice constitutes such a basic requirement for the community that 
meeting this need is a top priority. If the household budget is limited, members of the 
community will still try to buy rice by reducing their purchase of other necessities.  
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III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF RASKIN  
 
 
The document review, data analysis, and field visits revealed the presence of both good and 
bad features in Raskin implementation. Based on implementation practices, several positive 
and also a number of negative lessons can be drawn that can be used to improve program 
implementation. 
 
 
3.1 Positive Lessons 
 
The following positive lessons can be drawn from practices in the implementation of Raskin:  
a. Targeting accuracy is highly dependent on the level of commitment and roles of the 
regional government and implementers at the local level, socialization which stresses that 
Raskin rice is only for the poor households, the use of BPS data that has been verified at 
the local level, and the transparency of the list of beneficiaries. 
b. Price accuracy is dependent on whether or not rice is distributed directly to recipients 
from (primary) distribution points, the distance between the (primary) distribution point 
and the beneficiaries, and the size of the contribution from the APBD. 
 
 
3.2 Negative Lessons  
 
The negative lessons that warrant attention in the implementation of Raskin are as follows:  
a. The shortfall in the total allocation compared to the total number of RTM has caused 
targeting inaccuracies as well as inaccuracies in the amount of rice distributed to 
beneficiaries and distribution frequency. 
b. Targeting inaccuracy is influenced by weak socialization, community indifference, the 
lack of commitment from regional governments, and the shortfall in total rice allocation 
compared to the total number of RTM. 
c. The regional government’s lack of commitment is influenced by their saturation with the 
already long-running program which has become routine, program implementation that 
does not reflect the objectives, and weak socialization. 
d. Price inaccuracy is influenced by whether or not rice is distributed from the primary 
distribution point or a secondary distribution point, and how far it is from household 
beneficiaries. 
e. Distribution delays are caused by outstanding payments from the distribution points. 
f. Distribution delays affect the community’s readiness to allocate the time and prepare the 
funds for the purchase of the rice. 
g. The accuracy of distribution frequency and amount of rice that beneficiaries receive is 
not always a good indication of successful program implementation. Distribution 
frequency may be correct every month, but the amount of rice received may be below 
the stipulated amount, or vice versa. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
The Raskin program which has been running for nine years has used a significant amount of 
funds and involved many parties, but it is still not performing effectively. Therefore, Raskin 
should only be continued if the following conditions are met. 
 
a. The program must be revitalized. This can be done by implementing a guided national 
information campaign (socialization) to increase the awareness and real understanding of 
the program’s essence for all stakeholders, including local implementing agencies and the 
community. These socialization activities must be clearly regulated in Raskin’s General 
Guidelines. 
 
b. The allocation for beneficiary households at the national level must be firmly stipulated 
and appropriate for the total number of households in the targeted group. The target 
household category must be clearly defined, including whether it is limited to very poor 
households only or is to include poor or near poor households. 
 
c. One institution must oversee those responsible for the distribution of rice starting from 
procurement right down to distribution to the community in order to clarify the respective 
tasks, responsibilities, and how performance will be evaluated.  
 
d. Local governments must be responsible for dividing the allocation and ensuring accurate 
targeting of beneficiaries. To ensure accurate targeting, regional governments should verify 
the BPS data on RTM or other data which is used to determine targets at the national 
level.  
 
e. The maximum number of beneficiary households determined by verification at the 
village/kelurahan level must correspond to the total allocation the village has obtained in 
order to guarantee that the amount of rice for each household is as it should be according 
to the stipulations. The subdistrict should be responsible for formally approving and 
validating the list of targeted households. 
 
f. Arrangements must be made for (primary) distribution points to be located closer to 
household beneficiaries so they can distribute rice directly to beneficiaries. This would 
help to ensure that beneficiaries do not pay more than the stipulated rate. 
 
g. A policy is needed to force regional governments to seriously support Raskin’s 
implementation, through both providing funding support (through the APBD) and 
helping to achieve the program objectives. 
 
h. An incentive and penalty system should be introduced and implemented to ensure that the 
program is implemented in accordance with the guidelines. A reward should be given to 
regions or program implementers that successfully implement the program in line with the 
regulations, based on a set of predetermined indicators. Incentives could be in the form of 
an award, while penalties could take the form of media announcements identifying 
unsuccessful regions, or the dismissal, transfer of duties, or demotion of the implementing 
officials. 
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i. A serious, planned, and accountable practice of monitoring and evaluation activities by 
independent and credible external institutions will help to guarantee the appropriate 
implementation of Raskin and will support the incentive and penalty system. The results 
of monitoring activities must be widely presented to various parties including the public 
and systematically used for the improvement of the program’s implementation. 
 
j. All stipulations regarding the program’s implementation, such as those concerning 
socialization, targeting (verification and data reference), and monitoring and evaluation 
must be clearly regulated in the program’s guidelines. 
 
If those conditions are not met, Raskin should be ended and an in-depth study on the 
following aspects is required: 
a. the impact of Raskin’s phase out on the food security of poor households; 
b. the transfer of Raskin funds to poverty reduction programs that will provide better 
assistance for poor households; and   
c. Bulog’s role in the procurement and stabilization of the national price of rice, as currently 
more than 80% of the rice procured by Bulog has been distributed through the Raskin 
program. 
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